Do psychological operations benefit from the use of host nation media?

Transcription

1 Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items Do psychological operations benefit from the use of host nation media? Castro, Daniel A. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun

2 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS DO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BENEFIT FROM THE USE OF HOST NATION MEDIA? by Daniel A. Castro March 2007 Thesis Advisor: Second Reader: Jessica Piombo Michael Ceroli Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

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4 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA , and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project ( ) Washington DC AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE March TITLE AND SUBTITLE Do Psychological Operations Benefit from the Use of Host Nation Media? 6. AUTHOR(S) Daniel A. Castro 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master s Thesis 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Insert abstract here. Organizing and conducting effective psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives is a complex endeavor fraught with many challenges. The challenges include: a general negative attitude towards PSYOP / deception operations, the emphasis on kinetic platforms as the solution set for all crises to include unconventional warfare (UW), the sheer lack of numbers in both PSYOP personnel and equipment, and a recent upsurge of negativity from the world media of U.S. PSYOP due to the utilization of host nation media. This thesis will examine the benefits of host nation media from World War II to the present that include the utilization of media personnel and infrastructure in mediums of radio, newspapers, leaflets, posters, magazines, comic books, radio stations, satellite and terrestrial television. The merits of host nation media will be examined by analyzing their effect upon Psychological Operations (PSYOP) from the perspective of opposing countries in previous wars as well as U.S. PSYOP programs in both past and present conflicts in addition to the impact of counter-psyop from an adversarial point of view. The final goal of the thesis is to illustrate the need for the use of host nation media assets relevant to U.S. military and civil operations. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Psychological Operations, Strategic Communications 15. NUMBER OF PAGES PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified i 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT NSN Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std UL

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6 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited DO PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BENEFIT FROM THE USE OF HOST NATION MEDIA? Daniel A. Castro Major, United States Army B.S., Pittsburg State University, 1996 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 2007 Author: Daniel A. Castro Approved by: Jessica Piombo Thesis Advisor Michael Ceroli Second Reader Gordon McCormick Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis iii

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8 ABSTRACT Organizing and conducting effective psychological operations (PSYOP) in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives is a complex endeavor fraught with many challenges. The challenges include: a general negative attitude towards PSYOP / deception operations, the emphasis on kinetic platforms as the solution set for all crises to include unconventional warfare (UW), the sheer lack of numbers in both PSYOP personnel and equipment, and a recent upsurge of negativity from the world media of U.S. PSYOP due to the utilization of host nation media assets that portrays the U.S. as having a heavy hand in censuring the Iraqi and Afghan media. This thesis will examine the benefits of host nation media from World War II to the present that include the utilization of media personnel and infrastructure in mediums of radio, newspapers, leaflets, posters, magazines, comic books, radio stations, satellite and terrestrial television. The merits of host nation media will be examined by analyzing their effect upon Psychological Operations (PSYOP) from the perspective of opposing countries in previous wars as well as U.S. PSYOP programs in both past and present conflicts in addition to the impact of counter-psyop from an adversarial point of view. The final goal of the thesis is to illustrate the need for the use of host nation media assets relevant to U.S. military and civil operations. v

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10 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION...1 A. OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE...1 B. METHODOLOGY...4 C. THESIS OUTLINE...6 II. APPLICATION OF PSYOP AND DEFINING HOST NATION MEDIA...7 A. APPLICATION OF PSYOP...7 B. DEFINING THE HOST NATION MEDIA...10 III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES...17 A. INTRODUCTION...17 B. WORLD WAR II...18 C. THE KOREAN CONFLICT...29 D. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT...38 E. OPERATION DESERT STORM...50 F. THE BALKANS...57 IV. OIF / OEF...65 A. INTRODUCTION...65 B. PSYOP / PHASE I OIF...67 C. PSYOP / DURING OCCUPATION IN OIF...77 D. PSYOP / THE MERLIN INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF OEF...98 V. CONCLUSION LIST OF REFERENCES INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST vii

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12 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Iraqi host nation media as of November Figure ,000 KW Aspidistra transmitter used against Germany...28 Figure 3. The UN Troops Treat Them Good...31 Figure 4. The Army's Armed Forces Radio Service began as a mobile clandestine radio stations during the Korean War Figure 5. (Your Place Will Be Empty) Korean War Leaflet Figure 6. Parachute News No. 11 Korea Figure 7. (American casualty at Khe Sanh and an execution of a Viet Cong)...43 Figure 8. Leaflet HQ Figure 9. PSYOP radio broadcast in Vietnam...46 Figure 10. Vietnamese Journalist produce The Wondering Soul recordings...48 Figure 11. Similar depiction between Hitler and Hussein...54 Figure 12. Iraqis Surrendering...56 Figure 13. Smiling Iraqi EPW; Surrender campaign leaflet Figure 14. Leaflet 04-B-02-L Figure 15. NATO PSYOP composition and accompanying host nation media personnel...61 Figure 16. Information Radio Leaflet IZD-001 and IZD-002C Figure 17. Enemy Propaganda found by the 10 th Mountain Division...70 Figure 18. SOMS-B in BIAP May Figure 19. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Kuwait Figure 20. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from BIAP Figure 21. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Commando Solo Figure 22. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages From the USS Tarawa Figure 23. SOMS-B Coverage in Iraq...83 Figure 24. SOMS-B and Host Nation Media Coverage in Iraq Figure 25. (Zarqawi Campaign 2005)...86 Figure 26. (ISF and Iraqis Voting in 2005)...86 Figure 27. (Rewards for Tips Program 2005) Figure 28. (Anti-terrorist billboard along Route Irish near BIAP)...88 Figure 29. (Shanasheel Magazine in Baghdad)...89 Figure 30. (Shanasheel Magazine in Mosul)...89 Figure 31. (The Thunder Team Comic Book)...90 Figure 32. ( Tracking the Terrorist )...91 Figure 33. (Zarqawi Campaign )...96 Figure 34. (Merlin Signal Reception) Figure 35. (PSYOP injects for a two week period) Figure Hour Radio Wheel Figure 37. (Shortwave propagation strength) ix

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14 LIST OF TABLE Table 1. Locations of Satellite TV coverage...95 xi

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16 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my advisors, Dr. Jessica Piombo and LTC (P) Michael Ceroli for their insight, helpfulness, and patience in guiding me through my thesis development process. I would also like to thank my immediate peers: Jonathan Keiser, Mark Engen, Lee Evans, and Matt Zahn for their helpful input. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Janelle for her unwavering support and understanding during my thesis process, as well as my three girls: Cassandra, Maria, and Bianca. xiii

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18 I. INTRODUCTION A. OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE Following the terrorist attacks on September 11 th, the United States Government (USG) and the overwhelming majority of the American people have been perplexed as to the reasons for the attacks, as well as wondering what measures are being taken to convince the world, specifically, the Middle East, to attenuate the ever growing threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism. An enormous amount of time and resources have been spent by the Bush administration, State Department, Department of Defense, and various OGAs (Other Government Agencies), on how best to reach target audiences that have a profound effect on U.S. national security and objectives. The U.S. has been continuously engaged in two enormous military endeavors in Iraq and Afghanistan since The campaign in Iraq has been deeply plagued by a seemingly difficult quagmire against a stubborn insurgency, rising sectarianism, an increasingly hostile and disenchanted population that has begun to lose faith in the Coalition, as well the enormously difficult task of winning the battle of ideas. So how does the U.S. win the battle of the story? From a military perspective, the onus for swaying target audiences has fallen on psychological operations (PSYOP). Since the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, a plethora of PSYOP and information campaigns have been conducted in order to influence key target audiences in favor of U.S. operations. Such PSYOP campaigns have used every medium imaginable in getting the message out. For example, PSYOP in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have used loudspeakers, leaflets, posters, handbills, satellite television, FM, AM, shortwave radio, bumper stickers, T-shirts, and soccer balls, as well as face-to-face communication from all servicemen in contact with local populaces. Additionally, PSYOP campaigns have been tailored to match the receiving target audience in terms of size and specificity of the message. Specific PSYOP products have focused on the smallest village or town, while more broad and all-encompassing messages have been tailored for specific regions of a country, an entire country, or an entire set of countries in a similar culturally geographic region. Ultimately, the goal of influencing target audiences in support of OEF / OIF is to have Iraqis, Afghans, and 1

19 Middle Easterners in general, espouse the PSYOP objectives of: legitimacy, nonviolence, and eliminating safe havens for violent Jihadist ideology. The problem is that the U.S. is currently incapable of producing the conditions for winning the battle of the story with its PSYOP force structure and composition of personnel and equipment. Simply stated, the U.S. military and the United States Government (USG) does not have the ability to sustain a psychological campaign that can reach millions of Iraqis and Afghans at the same time because of the few media systems that the U.S. military possesses. Essentially, years of solely spending on kinetic systems, undercutting the Voice of America (VOA), and various instruments of persuasion, have now come to a head in terms of engaging in the war of ideas. As a point of comparison, consider the fact that a single company, Phillip Morris, spent more in one year on advertising ($2 billion) than the combined budgets of all U.S. agencies engaged in information operations and public diplomacy. 1 So naturally, the only other alternative is to use the somewhat controversial solution to U.S. psychological requirements; the use of host nation media. As a growing trend, more and more of the broad PSYOP messages have been disseminated via host nation media. Essentially, the host nation media allows U.S. forces to utilize existing platforms such as radio stations, TV stations, newspapers, and magazines that were originally meant for large audiences. Rather than solely relying on limited U.S. PSYOP dissemination assets, the use of host nation media adds an important facet to the PSYOP tool kit. Media dissemination platforms that were once used to transmit state propaganda and keep the public in the dark can be reframed to assist with a variety of PSYOP and information campaigns designed to support U.S. operations in a given theater. Accordingly, during Phase I of OEF and OIF, targeting officers viewed radio stations, signaling towers, and newspaper plants as potential assets for future operations. Usually such targets were not destroyed unless deemed absolutely necessary due to the potential benefit of Psychological Operations. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impact of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) that effectively utilizes host nation media as a means to persuading a given 1 Walter Laqueru. Save Public Diplomacy: Broadcasting America s Message Matters. Public Affairs (September / October 1994), 20. 2

20 target audience towards a behavior that is beneficial to U.S. objectives in a war or conflict. Utilizing host nation media can have many benefits for the U.S. For one, delivering PSYOP messages via host nation media outlets utilizes mediums that are familiar to the target audience and are often seen as more legitimate than foreign sources of media. Secondly, the host nation media is a platform that has the ability to reach across the broad populace of a given nation, thus effectively disseminating PSYOP messages that are meant for larger and broad audiences. Third, utilizing host nation media can be beneficial while augmenting existing U.S. PSYOP programs by assisting with: locating high value targets, voting information, command messages, highlighting civilian reconstruction programs, et al. Utilizing host nation media also helps to create a PSYOP message that the target audience can identify with, is far more cost effective than trying to replicate the target audiences preferred media, and lastly, it sets the given nation, namely Iraq, with a media investment for the future. Unfortunately, for as many good things that can come from host nation media, there can also be negative effects. Controlling the message and its dissemination is more difficult when working through proxies, and the very act of turning host nation media into proxies for U.S. PSYOP, if uncovered, can undermine the indigenous media. Additionally, historical evidence has shown that the enemy can just as effectively use counter PSYOP as well as imitating and perfecting the exact PSYOP used against them to turn the tide in their favor. Therefore, in order to avoid the pitfalls and maximize the benefits for future operations, this thesis attempts to draw out the past lessons of when the utilization of host nation media enhanced the achievement of mission objectives by analyzing the PSYOP strategies used by opposing forces from World War II to the present. This thesis is also important because it is the first of its kind: to date, no one has investigated the tradeoffs of using host nation media to pursue PSYOP goals, and therefore the major contribution of this thesis will be to generate a set of testable propositions about when host nation media utilization is likely to be effective, and when it is not. Although the thesis is novel in thought, the subject matter is derived from experts in the field that have written extensively on the topic of PSYOP to include the infusion of host nation media. Such experts in the field include: Stanley Sandler, David 3

21 Owen, Joseph Goebbels, Sefton Delmer, Henry Latimer, Lawrence Soley, Herbert Friedman, Edward Kaufman, and many others in the Psychological Operations Group (POGs) that have illuminated the importance of host nation media as a pillar of Psychological Operations. Ultimately, this thesis will shed some light on the effectiveness of utilizing host nation media in light of the recent upsurge in criticism due to the use of such assets. Such criticisms paint the U.S. PSYOP programs as buying the Iraqi or Afghan press, and thus controlling the press like the previous dictatorships. Others see the use of host nation media as a pitfall because of the target audiences perception that the message is no longer credible. My goal is to analyze the historical as well as the contemporary data to illustrate the impact upon forces both friendly and foe and to look into the historical data to see which forces used it best. This will provide valuable insight on how best to utilize or in the least, deal with the impact of host nation media upon combat operations in the future. B. METHODOLOGY Overall, the chapters in this thesis will highlight the negative and positive aspects of utilizing host nation media gleaned from historical and contemporary data. One difficult facet is that PSYOP is not a clean cut science where conclusions can be easily drawn; it is more of an art whose effects can be subtle and inconclusive, yet quite effective when employed correctly. Another aspect is that PSYOP takes time for it to take its course. Successful PSYOP campaigns often have identifiable Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) that allow the PSYOP planner and the combatant commander indicators that PSYOP is being successful. However, judging the effectiveness of a PSYOP campaign is extremely challenging. The effect is often cumulative, such as getting an enemy force to surrender after repeated PSYOP efforts coordinated with several military attacks. It is a frustrating aspect of PSYOP that there is usually no immediate and observable link between the cause (PSYOP) and effect. 2 Because of the difficulty in assessing this particular thesis topic, it was decided that the historical 2 Stephen E. Pease. PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania :Stackpole Books, 1992), 12. 4

22 analysis should be a holistic amalgam of the contributions that host nation media has had on PSYOP as well as its impact on the battlefield. In terms of evaluating the success of PSYOP, there is no general way to evaluate results as the benchmarks for success for each PSYOP mission are unique to themselves. Instead of a general rubric for evaluating the campaigns, in this paper success will be evaluated through the use of measurable actions by the target audience that correlate to the objectives and related MOEs that are specific to each PSYOP campaign. 3 As planners develop a PSYOP campaign, they establish specific MOEs that provide a systematic means of assessing and reporting the impact a PSYOP program (series of PSYOP products and actions) has on specific foreign target audiences. PSYOP MOEs, change from mission to mission, and encompass a wide range of factors that are fundamental to the overall effect of PSYOP. PSYOP impact indicators collectively provide an indication of the overall effectiveness of the PSYOP campaign. Development of MOEs and their associated impact indicators are done during the planning process. By determining the measure in the planning process, PSYOP planners ensure that organic assets and PSYOP enablers, such as intelligence, are identified to assist in evaluating MOEs for the execution of PSYOP. Evaluating the effectiveness of PSYOP may take weeks or even longer given the inherent difficulties and complexities of the battlefield environment. 4 Examples of MOEs are: behavior that is in concert with a specific PYSOP product, a sudden increase in surrenders, enemy admissions about the effectiveness of PSYOP, enemy counter-psyop, combat after action reports (AARs), and interviewing prisoners to ascertain whether PSYOP played a role in their capture or surrender. Conversely, determining MOEs are often hard to accomplish because results are usually vague, often unknown, and are difficult to assess due to its relativity to human nature. Additionally, the fog of war makes it difficult to assess due to the numerous variables that are working in concert with PSYOP on a daily basis. 3 It is difficult assessing human behavior related to a PSYOP message because there are so many other factors in a combat environment that can indirectly sway a target audience to meet a specific PSYOP objective. However, there are conclusive MOEs such as EPW polling data, a sudden increase in surrenders, or behavior that is so specific as it leaves no doubt that the PSYOP message was being adhered to. 4 U.S. Joint Publication Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations (Fort Monroe, Virginia: September 2003), 23. 5

23 One example where determining an MOE can prove challenging is a PSYOP program that is employed to lower the morale of a foreign target audience. The lowering of morale in itself is a difficult outcome to measure, especially if access to the target audience is difficult as well. However, the lowering of morale can lead to situations that can easily be discerned such as riots, civil discontent among the youth, an overthrow or a favorable election of a foreign government. In the end, the challenges of linking PSYOP with outcomes are an everyday facet that continuously has to be dealt with. Such disparities and vagueness of MOEs are addressed in this thesis by utilizing experts with the benefit of hindsight in the field to fill the gaps and provide a clear assessment of the true impact of host nation media. Unfortunately, many of the documents and records that are crucial in determining the effectives of PSYOP have long been destroyed, lost, or continue to be secretly held. 5 C. THESIS OUTLINE In Chapter I, the thesis problem is introduced. In Chapter II, aspects of U.S. PSYOP and the host nation media are briefly discussed as a primer in order to allow the reader to gain insight on the nuances of each media and how their inter-relations effect each other. Chapter III will examine historical case studies whereupon host nation media have been used. It will also provide the foundation and the direction of the thesis based on the positive and negative aspects of utilizing host nation media in a variety of combat operations. Chapter IV will be a continuance of chapter three but with a detailed emphasis on two contemporary conflicts; OIF and the Merlin shortwave initiative during OEF. And lastly, Chapter V will draw upon conclusions based on the case files examined that will either support or negate the use of host nation media assets in support of PSYOP. 5 Michael Balfour. Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany (London: Routledge and Kegan 1979), 99. 6

24 II. APPLICATION OF PSYOP AND DEFINING HOST NATION MEDIA A. APPLICATION OF PSYOP The moral of the enemy is the target of high priority, its reduction an essential preliminary to the armed clash. --Sun Tzu, The Art of War 6 The overall purpose of this thesis paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of utilizing host nation media assets in support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Before we can define host nation media, it is necessary to provide a clear understanding of what PSYOP is and is not. Generally, in terms of the U.S., PSYOP is viewed as an effective force multiplier at every level to include: U.S. politicians, the media, the U.S. populace, and military commanders. However, what is not agreed upon are the usage of tactics that are deceptive in nature in spite of their effectiveness. Although PSYOP is a viable combat multiplier, it has different meanings and connotations to many that include being seen by decision makers, a large number of Americans, and even military commanders in a negative light. Others see PSYOP as sort of a mystic spoon-bending apparatus and perceived as un-american in nature. The 1 st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) defines PSYOP as planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign target audiences (TAs) to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The emphasis is placed on foreign audiences because in accordance with U.S. law, it is not permissible to target U.S. citizens with PSYOP messages. 7 Essentially, PSYOP messages of all forms are the maneuver commander s tool to communicate with foreign target audiences. While PSYOP is considered a combat and diplomatic multiplier, more importantly, it is also considered a combat reducer. The basic fundamental role of PSYOP is to get the desired target audience to adhere to the commander s objectives without the use of kinetic means, since that entails loss of life and equipment on both sides, as well as 6 Samuel B. Griffith trans. Sun Tzu: The Art of War (New York: Oxford Press, 1971), st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). PSYOP Officers Course 1-04 Lecture Notes (Fort Bragg, NC 2005), 2. 7

25 employing forces that are possibly needed elsewhere. To effect the mission, the target audience must feel that adhering to the U.S. PSYOP message benefits them in some sort of fashion. For many it could mean self preservation, prosperity, financial gain, reducing terrorism, and increasing the ambient security. Through these methods, PSYOP campaigns attempt to use carrots instead of sticks, persuasion instead of force. In this way, PSYOP campaigns are meant to alleviate the pressures put on kinetic units. The logic is that since the fighting forces cannot be everywhere they are needed, soft power techniques augment their presence. 8 As defined by Joseph S. Nye Jr., soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. 9 Because PSYOP campaigns aim to influence behavior as well winning the hearts and minds of a target audience, they can be considered as instruments of soft power that operate at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. Strategic level PSYOP include international information, campaigns conducted by U.S. Government Agencies to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions, and behavior in favor of U.S. goals and objectives during peacetime and conflict. These endeavors predominantly take place outside the military arena but can use DoD assets and receive support from military PSYOP forces. Operational level PSYOP is conducted across the range of military operations in a defined operational area to promote the effectiveness of the Joint Force Commander s (JFC s) campaigns and strategies, and to strengthen U.S. and multinational capabilities to conduct military operations. A clear example of operational PSYOP is a product or message that is intended for the entire audience of Iraq. The operational aspect of the message is broad enough for the entire target audience of Iraq to consume without getting too specific, or alienating one group from another. Such uses of operational PSYOP are most effective when used with broad ranging mediums such as FM, AM, shortwave radio, satellite, terrestrial television, and newspapers due to the broad and general nature of the message. Tactical PSYOP are operations conducted in the area assigned by a tactical commander across the range of 8 Joseph S. Nye PhD. Soft Power, The Means to Success in the Political World. (New York: Public Affairs a member of the Perseus Books Group 2004), 5. 9 Ibid. 8

26 military operations to support the tactical mission against opposing forces, and shape and influence military and civilian perceptions within the tactical commander s area of operations. Tactical PSYOP provides a means to minimize resistance and interference while facilitating military objectives. 10 An example of tactical PSYOP could be a message from a division commander in Fallujah, Iraq that implores the local citizens to inform coalition forces of any possible insurgents within their neighborhoods. This thesis will primarily analyze operations conducted at the Operational PSYOP level, and depending on the message, the tactical PSYOP as well. In addition to the levels of PSYOP (strategic, operational, and tactical), there are also different forms of PSYOP based on the target audiences perception of where the source of the message is coming from. The perceived source of the PSYOP is a critical factor for the use of host nation media assets in terms of maintaining credibility with the target audience as well as disguising the origin of the message. Generally, PSYOP messages at all levels can be classified as white, gray, or black PSYOP. White PSYOP, which comprises the overwhelming majority of all PSYOP products, is PSYOP in which the target audience can clearly discern the actual source of the message. An example is a radio message or a television commercial that is directly from the Multi-National Force- Iraq (MNF-I) commander describing the need for the local populace to call the terrorist hotline if a suspicious activity is observed. Overall, the message leaves very little doubt in the target audience s mind where the source is coming from. The second type of PSYOP is gray PSYOP. Gray PSYOP is one which the source of the message is unclear to the target audience. An example might be a television commercial that is depicted as being directly from the Iraqi government but its actual content and source is actually from MNF-I. This form of PSYOP is quite critical since it allows the fledgling Iraqi government to take credit for the actual source of the message. When discussing the use of host nation media to disseminate messages, we mostly refer to this form of PSYOP. The third type is black PSYOP. Black PSYOP occurs when a carefully crafted message intentionally misrepresents the source. An example of black 10 1 st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). PSYOP Officers Course 1-04 Lecture Notes (Fort Bragg, NC 2005), 3. 9

27 PSYOP could be a doctored letter that is perceived to be from one terrorist to another that falsely states an intention to surrender. It is important to note that just because a product is considered white does not mean that it is truthful. The same can be said with gray and black PSYOP. However, the overwhelming majority of PSYOP is truthful because messages and PSYOP campaigns are based on maintaining credibility with the target audience. Essentially, a PSYOP product ceases to become viable once the target audience recognizes it to be false. This is an important and also delicate aspect of utilizing host nation media. If false stories are prevalent, and the target audience recognizes that the host nation media is a propaganda outlet for the U.S., the entire premise of utilizing host nation media is then jeopardized. B. DEFINING THE HOST NATION MEDIA Host nation media is the medium or source of information that is readily watched, read, or listened to by the target audience that the U.S. is trying to influence. In many areas of conflict the host nation usually hold a decisive advantage against any U.S. PSYOP systems in regards to sophistication, range, quality, quantity, and accessibility to the desired target audience. If the majority of a given nation attains their news and entertainment via satellite television, then it would make sense to take advantage of the media vectors that the target audience gravitates to. It is important to understand that what is seen or heard in one country, may not be the case in another. Simple cookie cutter PSYOP programs seldom work, as they must have the correct cultural nuances, language, and dissemination mediums that are specific to a desired target audience. An example is the comparison of media in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, the predominant means of attaining information is satellite television, radio, and newspapers in that order. 11 In Afghanistan, the primary medium is shortwave radio with very little television and print. Effectively, Iraq and Afghanistan are two countries with different cultural norms, languages, literacy rates, and mediums for acquiring information. Therefore, utilizing host nation media assets in each country require PSYOP campaigns that are appropriate for each type of media. 11 MNF-I, Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) media poll conducted (Baghdad, Iraq: March 2005). 10

28 Just as intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is important in determining the disposition of the enemy, equally important is the intelligence that accurately depicts cultural fault lines as well as identifying the most popular forms of media. In targeting the media outlets, a detailed map of the region with all the newspapers, radio stations, television stations, power stations is crucial in understanding the information environment. Attaining critical data such as transmission power, coverage, gain, wattage, and propagation are critical in understanding what assets will be available once operations commence within a given theater. Out of this information, the U.S. military prepares an information propagation picture that details the countries top television and radio stations, newspapers, print presses, and any form of media that could be critical in gaining advantage in PSYOP. In Iraq, the information propagation picture depicted below was prepared by November of During this period, many of the newspapers and radio stations were assessed to be cooperative or receptive for potential U.S. PSYOP broadcasts and print while others were perceived as hostile. This was important because it defined the host nation information battle space in relation to U.S. operations during the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom MNFI-I Strategic Communications (STATCOM) Media Assessment (Camp Victory, Iraq; November 2003). 11

29 N N N N N N N N N N-2 N N N N N N Radio Red TV Black Newspaper - N Figure 1. Iraqi host nation media as of November In addition to the host nation media, U.S. PSYOP has to also contend with an international media such as Al Jazeera that are even more sophisticated than anything the U.S. is currently capable of producing. 14 Additionally, with the advent of satellite TV, the U.S. not only has to compete with anti-coalition media within a country, it now has to contend with neighboring satellite reception and programming that is anti-u.s. as well. Essentially, cable and satellite TV and radio, and especially the public internet, offer far more choices than over-the-air networks did formerly. 15 Yet technological advances, 13 MNFI-I Strategic Communications (STATCOM) Media Assessment (Camp Victory, Iraq; November 2003). 14 Office of the Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict. (Washington D.C.: May 2000), Office of the Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict. (Washington D.C.: May 2000),

30 while they pose challenges to PSYOP programs, also present new opportunities. For one, the new technologies introduce a broad range of channels that a target audience in a host nation can now watch. This multiplies the possible entry points for PSYOP messages. This has the potential of broadening the target audience s horizon by exposing them to objective programming. Another positive is the target audience in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, poses a strong demand for satellite television, of which many are receptive to sell air time to the U.S. government. On balance, however, the U.S. PSYOP effort is placed in a definite disadvantage due to the collective and virtually unlimited investment that the world-wide media possesses compared to the very limited amount of money invested by the U.S. in PSYOP as a whole. In addition to considering all the possible forms of media for PSYOP exploitation, it also must be flexible and adaptive. A good PSYOP program must recognize that it cannot remain postured as it was during the beginning of hostilities. It must adapt and change with the current environment. For instance, when despotic regimes are overthrown, there is a tendency for a surge in communications of all sorts. This is due to a breakdown of the strict monopoly that was once previously held by the state - now being turned into an information vacuum. 16 During my time in Kosovo in , I was amazed how quickly satellite dishes were popping up once the oppressive regime fell. From a good vantage point, one could see at least a thousand dishes from any direction. In order to be successful, changing and adapting the PSYOP plan may have to mirror the current trends in the media. Unfortunately, that is not an investment that the U.S. normally makes as opposed to E Qaeda who remain high-tech and always managing to stay parallel with the current media fore structure. 17 There is no doubt that the PSYOP effort for the U.S. is an uphill and arduous battle. The battle of the story is up for grabs, and it seems that Al Qaeda has mastered it superbly. For Al Qaeda, they do not have a massive expenditure on advertising budget 16 Phillips W. Davison, The Third Person Effect in Communication. Public Opinion Quarterly (1983), Remarks of John Arquilla during a presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on the Warfare in the Information Age ( Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California September 2005), 12. John Arquilla is a professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California. Dr Arquilla is a former policy analyst at the RAND Corporation who has written extensively on terrorist networks and foreign policy. His works include: From Troy to Entebbe, In Athena s Camp, Networks and Net wars, and the Reagan Imprint. 13

31 that doles out money to the world media; they simply let their actions receive air time for free. 18 The relationship with Al Qaeda and the media is an interesting paradox. The news outlets are always hungry for a story, and Al Qaeda s spectacular attacks give them that source. Al Qaeda then has a willing source to project their terror via the newspapers, radio stations, satellite and terrestrial television. It is almost a pseudo-symbiotic relationship. How many thousands of hours of news time did the attacks on 9/11 produce? The amount is staggering. Overall, Al Qaeda is executing an effective job of manipulating the media to spread its terror. The U.S. should not expect anything less than Al Qaeda continuing ongoing operations with the same methodology for the next several decades. 19 In addition to Al Qaeda, the U.S. also has to contend with the endemic hatred for U.S. foreign policy around the world. U.S.-backed repressive rulers such as the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia, Suharto in Indonesia, and General Sani Abacha in Nigeria, while discreetly making deals with their American patrons and often enriching themselves from oil revenues, have proven their piety to the masses by encouraging the state-controlled press to demonize America. 20 The media have thus provided the government a safety valve through which to redirect anger from their social and political failures. Nowhere is this threat greater than in Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden is, in many ways, that country s true son, a product of the contradiction between the sheikdom s support for U.S. strategic interests and the virulent anti-americanism that the Saudis cultivate and export from their mosques and madrasas. 21 Clearly the U.S. response to an ever challenging war of ideas should come from all aspects and at all levels from the U.S. government. One answer to stem the tide of hatred towards the U.S. is the formulation of an international voice comprised of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). Formulated in 1999 as a result of the alarming success that hate radio had in the Balkans, its goal was to influence foreign audiences and conduct objective broadcasting. The BBG is reported to have over a 100 million 18 Remarks of John Arquilla during a presentation at the Naval Postgraduate School on the Warfare in the Information Age ( Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California September 2005), Ibid. 20 David Hoffman. Beyond Public Diplomacy Foreign Affairs (March / April 2002), Ibid. 14

32 listeners that tune into the BBG for U.S. sponsored TV programs that range in over 65 languages. The overall objective is promoting democracy through timely and objective broadcasting. 22 However, despite the BBG playing a critical role in delivering information to critical areas around the world, to this date, the U.S. has not established programming that adequately addresses the growing surge in satellite television and the internet. 23 The lack of satellite usage as a medium can be solved with the buying of more air time. The problem with purchasing more air time, though, is budgetary: since the BBG was created in 1994, its budget has declined by about 12 percent, from $573 million to $507 million. 24 The BBG has the programming, but needs more satellite time and modern television production facilities and equipment, not only in the United States but also in regional centers overseas, to combat biased stations such as Al Jazeera. 25 Conversely, Al Qaeda can be seen and heard on the internet, satellite television, as well as radio for free of charge because their message is newsworthy. Likewise, Usama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders are aired internationally via high tech satellite television, while the U.S. message is concentrated on a secondary form of media throughout most of the world. It seems ironic that Al Qaeda can deliver a video tape to Al Jazeera within hours; the tape is then played or aired to millions around the world. Therein lies the challenge in Strategic Information and PSYOP planning at all levels in terms of winning the war of ideas. Fortunately for the U.S., the platform that Usama Bin Laden enjoys has also been available to the U.S. Sadly, the opportunity has been squandered. In his September 20 speech to the nation, President Bush defined the U.S. attitude to the rest of the world but particularly to toward Arabs and Muslims in unequivocal terms. Either you are with us or with the terrorists, President Bush warned the rest of the world in his speech to a 22 Stephen Johnson, Dale Helle. How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy. The Heritage Foundation: Backgrounder, April 23, Journal on-line. Available from us publdipl.pdf; Internet; accessed 23 October Antony J. Blinken. Winning the War of Ideas. The Washington Quarterly (2003). The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology : 25:2, 110. Antony J. Blinken is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and served on the National Security Council from 1994 to Ibid., Ibid. 15

33 joint session of congress. Such a polarized message does not address the threat of terrorism and leaves little room for dialogue. 26 The lesson that can be inferred strikes not only at the importance of having the ability to convey the message, but more importantly, actually saying the right message to the right target audience. A secondary lesson is the diffusion of the message from the intended target audience to the unintended target audience. Although the speech was effective in terms of the American populace, the message soon reached foreign governments that were not necessarily receptive to being placed on the spot, especially countries such as Pakistan whose government possesses a tenuous and fragile control over much of its territory. 26 Lamis Andoni. Deeds Speak Louder Than Words. The Washington Quarterly (2003). The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology : 262. Lamis Andoni, a Middle East analyst, is widely published in Western and Arabic newspapers. 16

34 III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES A. INTRODUCTION In supporting the thesis, it was important to examine the utility of host nation media not only in the present, but in the past as well. Instead of just picking specific instances in history, it was important to examine several engagements, going back six decades to establish a historical baseline that would prove its importance regardless of the time period. However, with so many historical case studies to choose from, it is imperative that the case studies represent pertinent examples for the examination of the benefits and drawbacks of utilizing or replicating host nation media assets. In this chapter, the case studies that were picked include significant uses of host nation media from World War II to the present era that had a dramatic impact. In that sense, the use of host nation media can truly be examined in a holistic manner whose merits can be judged as standing the test of time. The analysis begins with World War II because that is where the use of radio and the maximization of host nation media first came into effect. The Germans and the English felt so highly about the importance of host nation media that they chose to replicate national media outlets in their black PSYOP programs. The next case is the Korean Conflict, which is important because it showed how a previously non-existent and severely undermanned PSYOP fore structure benefited from host nation media. An analysis of Vietnam, provide accounts of specific campaigns of PSYOP that were effective and successful in their goals of winning the war of ideas for the North Vietnamese. The aspects of Desert Storm and the Balkans are important because these cases transition into the use of host nation media in the era of the 24 hour news cycle. In terms of the metrics in examining each case, the historical case studies will not have a uniform set of evaluation criteria because of the variances in MOEs. Instead, the analysis will hone in on whether the MOEs specific to the PSYOP campaign in a particular conflict were successfully achieved with the aid of host nation media. The MOEs that support the thesis will be driven from enemy behavior, imitation, opposing accounts on the effects, and the long-term historical analysis from veterans and experts alike. Historical analysis is important because MOEs are often uncovered years 17

35 or even decades after a conflict is over. An example is a veteran of a war being interviewed or archives discovered that addresses the impact of a particular PSYOP program. The advent of radio, television, and newspapers, as a source for psychological operations has been prevalent throughout most of the 20 th century. Since people in either peacetime or war depend upon the media for information, naturally, opposing forces have tried to utilize the host nation media to gain a psychological advantage over the enemy and the populace. Additionally, since the host nation media is often the most trusted media in a given country, opposing states have also gone to great lengths in re-creating host nation media with the hopes of injecting occasional psychological products that supported their wartime objectives. The cases examined include the use of media in World War II by the English and the Germans. Additionally, historical examples in Korea, Vietnam, Desert Storm, and the Balkans will establish a step-by-step chronological analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of host nation media. The analysis will then set the stage for Chapter IV in which contemporary use of host nation media will be examined. B. WORLD WAR II Out of the many examples throughout the 20 th century, the PSYOP and propaganda efforts in World War II are distinct due to the uninhibited environment and the nature of the PSYOP and propaganda campaigns of both the Allies and the Axis powers. As a result, the PSYOP efforts had a profound effect on the outcome of the war. In the book The Radio War, David Owen describes how radio waves carried signals and communications between ships and aircraft, bases and units, headquarters and agents, on a scale never experienced. The very medium of radio waves and print became an entirely new battlefield with its own weaponry, its own tactics and its own rules. 27 In terms of assessing the impact that host nation media had, the primary MOEs for determining success in World War II for this thesis will be: captured prisoners, enemy counter 27 David Owen. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979),

36 PSYOP, recorded behavior in direct concert with the PSYOP message, enemy admissions, captured documents, imitation of the enemies PSYOP strategies, and historical hindsight. 28 Prior to and during the beginning of the war, the predominance of the campaigns consisted of mainly white PSYOP. As mentioned in Chapter II, white PSYOP utilizes messages whose sources are easily identifiable by the intended audience. Such messages were expanded during this period when there was an explosion of mass communicationbroadcasting, worldwide wire news services, mobile printing presses, and motion pictures that provided instruments of psychological operations previously undreamed of. 29 White PSYOP was masterfully used by the Minister of Information, Joseph Goebbels, who orchestrated the use of radio, the press, demonstrations, group meetings abroad, agents, displays, and once the attacks started, screaming dive bombers. The Nazis gave the first full dress-demonstration of what psychological operations can accomplish with the new tools of mass communication. 30 Its effect was so profound that the Allies began following suit. PSYOP campaigns of both the Allies and Axis powers expanded to not only conducting white PSYOP, but also conducted black PSYOP deception operations that set propaganda campaigns to a whole new level. This was quite a change since white PSYOP was the norm that typically was used for surrender appeals and the lowering of the enemies morale. 31 The recognition of both sides of the effects of host nation media led to multiple efforts to control, negate, and replicate such information mediums. Such replication of PSYOP took hold and evolved into effective black PSYOP campaigns that had a dramatic effect upon the war. White PSYOP broadcast from England to Germany, and vice versa, would concentrate on overt radio messages that concentrated on German or British defeats while also encouraging morale within their country and lowering morale upon the citizens and 28 William.Daugherty A Psychological Warfare Casebook (New York: Arno Press, 1979), Phillip P.Katz (LTC retired). Mclaurin, Ronald. Abbot. Preston S. Psychological Operations Principles and Case Studies: A Critical Analysis of US PSYOP. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), Ibid., Kermit Roosevelt. War Report of the OSS (New York: Walker and Company, 1976),

37 military personnel of their adversary. The broadcasters were well known, which meant that the goals of the broadcasts were obvious to the target audiences, and the recipients, knowing the source of the messages, would already know what the content of the message would be. This limited the utility of white PSYOP, because it only spoke to those already converted to the message. 32 On the other hand, if a so-called British radio station were to produce normal pro- British broadcasts, the effect of any occasional hint of bad news would be greatly magnified, as its listeners would tend to accept it as the truth; thus the essence of black PSYOP. 33 Therefore, as opposed to white PSYOP, black PSYOP was carefully disguised. Black PSYOP had to be quite clever to be believed by the target audience. Radio stations that produced black PSYOP produced broadcasts that were in accordance with the target audiences expectation. As the listeners tuned in to familiar music, various entertainment shows, and news updates, the listeners would then be ripe for occasional bits of information that would be misleading. The uncertainty of the listeners would often cause panic, a lowering of morale, and wasted resources and time in reaction to the false PSYOP. During World War II, black PSYOP was relatively easy to create because the British and the Germans were no stranger to each other s culture. Such familiarity allowed for the re-creation of host nation media that were incredibly identical to actual host nation media in terms of content, colloquialisms, language, and even the expected regional accents within Germany or Great Britain. The results of such familiarity allowed for fake message broadcasts to be believed by the target audience because they could not discern the difference between legitimate media and external PSYOP. In fact, the PSYOP broadcasts were so close to the actual host nation media that it created an aura of confusion when the targeted country would refute the broadcast. An example is a PSYOP radio broadcast from Germany to France that is then refuted by the French and then followed by another PSYOP broadcast refuting Frances s counter PSYOP message. This PSYOP game of who s on first-who s on second left the target audience not 32 David Owen. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979), Ibid. 20

38 knowing who or what to believe. Joseph Goebbels thrived on such confusion by insisting that the PSYOP messages be genuine to British listeners by making scathing attacks on Germany and the Nazis, but underneath this sugar-coating came the propaganda pill. 34 Such deceptive tactics were mastered by the Germans and was a factor in their success early in the war. 35 The Germans began their psychological offensive in the winter of under the strict supervision of Joseph Goebbels. By January and February, two secret transmitters began broadcasting against the British and the French. One transmitter was passed off as a secret station run by the French Communist Party, while the other posed as an anti-government British station that was based in Ireland. On 10 May, 1940, German forces swept into Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and France while also shattering or overtaking all communication nodes in the process. All throughout Western Europe, people were worried and impatient with official broadcasts that shed little light on the situation. Rumors were rampant and a target audience evolved as well as an information void that the Germans could exploit. Thus the conditions were set for the Germans to begin to take advantage of a vulnerable target audience in need of any news and information. 36 Seizing the communications advantage, the Germans began transmitting news items via German and captured host nation transmitters about the Fifth Columnists that were perceived by many to be rampant throughout Western Europe. The concept of the Fifth Columnists was a fabrication by German propagandists that according to radio, to be found anywhere and everywhere, organizing acts of sabotage, treachery and murder to help the French defeat. 37 Hitting multiple targets in one message, the Germans also transmitted that many of the saboteurs were Germans in the guise of Jewish refugees, which helped the Germans to manipulate the French into persecuting Jewish refugees who were seeking escape from persecution in Germany. This was evidenced in 34 David Owen. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979), Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

39 Joseph Goebbel s secret conference notes. In these notes, Goebbel commented on the Fifth Columnists programs, saying in the present situation, even Jews from Germany are nothing but German agents. 38 As the Germans pushed their advance deeper in French territory, and the French military was in utter chaos and retreat, the confusion and panic amongst the populace grew even worse. It was then that the German transmitters began stepping up their transmissions with their watch out for the Fifth Columnist scare with unprecedented success. 39 As predicted and planned by the Germans, the Fifth Column scare began to creep into the French newspapers and continued to cause even further damage to an already desperate and depressing situation. This was helped by the fact that German influence had crept into the French news papers to the tune of 350 million francs reported during a six month period leading up to the Munich agreement and much more thereafter. 40 The PSYOP broadcast caused the French populace to worry about the Fifth Column and concentrated on looking for traitors in their midst as opposed to countering the true threat, the German advance. Amazingly, the panic was started and perpetuated by mostly French officials who were obsessed by what they imagined the Fifth Column to have done. 41 Additionally, the Germans planted stories in the broadcasts that warned the Germans were pillaging all the cash from banks, thus causing the French to precipitate an economic breakdown as a result of a panic to withdraw their money from the French banks. 42 Overall, is there is evidence that there was a large listening audience that tuned into the German broadcast such as the Stuttgart broadcasts even despite the realization 38 William A. Boelcke., Ed. The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels: October 1939 March 1943 (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1970), Ibid., Michael Balfour. Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany. (London: Routledge and Kegan 1979), Ibid. 42 David Owen. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979),

40 that some channels were German in disguise. 43 Unfortunately for the French, the listening audience was also the French military that would eventually find itself struggling with collaboration and resistance towards the invading Germans. 44 Ironically, even if the Black PSYOP broadcast was discovered to be German, the French public and the military listened because they distrusted their government and the French media; a distrust that was hardened by the French government s vacillating policies, past deceptions, and failure to clearly explain why it was at war with Germany over Poland. 45 The final testament to the effectiveness of the broadcasts was the mistrust of the French government as a result of the propaganda effort of the black German PSYOP broadcasts throughout the early part of the war, of which the primary target was Prime Minister Paul Reynaud. As France collapsed, Reynaud was arrested and nearly executed while Marsal Phillippe Petain established the pro-nazi Vichy government, per the wishes of the various clandestine (seemingly French) radio broadcasts. 46 The decisive defeat of France was a culmination of kinetic and soft power assets that took advantage of a populace panicked by tanks and dive bombers, as well as the threat of the fabricated Fifth Column that was perceived to be around them. Such panic was then amplified by the French media by prominent writers such Charles Rolo. Like many writers in the 1940s, Rolo believed that a Nazi fifth column undermined France s ability to fight and led to the rapid defeat of the French army during the brief May-June 1940 war. 47 Similarly, Edmond Taylor 48 a journalist in France during the German invasion and later turned OSS agent, described in his book, The Strategy of Terror, how 43 Lawrence C Soley. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), Janos Radvanyi, Pierre Lacoste. Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Term Strategic Planning: The French Army and Psychological Warfare (Westport, CT: Greenwood Pub Group. 1990), Central and Western Europe: Prospects of Russian Dominance (January 11, 1944), FDR, Map Room Files, box 73, OSS Numbered Bulletin Lawrence C. Soley. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), Gaston Coblentz. German Revolt Asked by Exile Group in Russia. New York Herald Tribune, 22 June 1943, Edmond Taylor became a widely cited author among psychological warfare theorists due to his extensive experience as a journalist in France and as an OSS agent. 23

41 rumors, sabotage, and above ground and clandestine broadcasts worked together to bring about the defeat of France. 49 In fact, the German PSYOP was so good that he recommended the need to utilize Fifth Column tactics- fighting fire with fire to the eventual creator of the OSS (the present day CIA). 50 Soon Bill Donovan, who recruited Taylor, began to believe in the effectiveness of this strategy that would ultimately have a measurable impact on how the OSS viewed PSYWAR. 51 The overall use of PSYOP media started with a few German transmitters and then grew with captured French transmitters, and then snowballed into the full-force German PSYOP that made its way into the actual host nation French media. The result was a German attack designed to demoralize the enemy, to destroy the cohesion, discipline, and collective morale [of France].to break the enemy s will to win or simply his will to resist. 52 The result was a systematic and complete collapse of a European superpower, and the world being stunned at a German military machine that had just decimated the French. 53 Additionally, the method and rapidity of the French collapse profoundly affected the British who soon began to believe there were Fifth Columns in England as well. 54 Most historians agree that the Germans were beat in World War II by the Allied Forces imitating their tactics and producing similar weaponry. The German use of Panzer tanks, air-land doctrine, and the first use of paratroopers were all mimicked to perfection by the allies. 55 The Allies also incorporated the Germans PSYOP techniques and used 49 Andrew Roth, Free Germany Aims at Nazi Morale, New York Times, 5 September 1943, E4. 50 Lawrence C. Soley. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), Ibid., Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 27 July 1943, D David Owen. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Crane Russak & Company, 1979), Lawrence C.Soley. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), History Learning Site. Hitler and the Nazi s. December Article on-line. Available from Internet; Accessed 15 December

42 similar campaigns to affect the demise of the Third Reich. The British soon became quite adept in the information domain and soon began conducting black PSYOP that replicated German host nation media and exploited target audiences in similar fashion. Such exploitations were made infamous by a journalist named Sefton Delmer, the mastermind of the British black PSYOP campaign during WWII. Sefton Delmer was an Australian professor who spent time as a newsman in Berlin became very familiar with the German culture and mindset, as well as being fluent in German. Eventually, through various connections in the media, Delmer became acquainted with Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, Hermann Goering, and various Nazis within the Third Reich. By 1940, he moved to England due to his opposition to the Nazi regime and quickly gained acceptance into the intelligence world after a lengthy security clearance process. 56 After obtaining his clearance, Delmer began work immediately by manning two radio programs. One was led by a group called The Émigré German Marxists that ran the program: Radio of the European Revolution. The other was run under the guise that targeted the right-wing opposition to the Nazis. Like the Germans, Delmer, made his listeners believe that a large and active resistance organization was thriving within Germany. In a clever move, Delmer made the programs patriotic whose target audiences were lower ranking Nazis. His broadcasts criticized the senior Nazi officials who were bungling the direction of the war, letting down the soldiers and the people, and feathering their own nests at the expense of Germany. 57 Other radio programs he made gave the German soldiers manning the Atlantic Wall a feeling of isolation and hopelessness, while many of their colleagues were being sent to the Eastern front to face the Soviets. 58 Delmer s programs cut at the heart of natural curiosity. Much of the success was because they secured a hearing as does gossip, or a newspaper columnist, by gratifying curiosity and anxiety, the desire to know as much as possible, to get the [ inside story ], 56 Sefton Delmer. Black Boomerang (London: Secker and Warburg Ltd, 1962), David Owen. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Crane Russak & Company, 1979), Ibid.,

43 even at the cost of not knowing how much of it is reliable. 59 To appease such a curiosity, Delmer concocted stories how blood was being obtained from Russian and Polish POWs, and then were given to German soldiers and citizens despite the fact that much of the blood supply was infected with venereal diseases and various impurities. The result was another series of morale killers that made many within Germany become leery of receiving blood transfusions or giving blood in general. 60 As the programs began to make their mark, Delmer switched themes in order to keep up with changing attitudes. For instance, Delmer began focusing on pro-desertion programming that gave subtle hints that Americans and British officials had been very generous with German POWs by supplying them with a healthy food quota, as well as emphasizing the ever increasing numbers of deserters as well. 61 As the war progressed, the programming became so effective that even the Allies were fooled into believing they were credible. One example is the Delmer lead radio station, Gustav Siegfried. American attaches in London not privy to the Black PSYOP programs, mistook the programming to be German in nature, and reported back to Washington that there was a dramatic increase in hostilities between Nazi party and army leaders. 62 As the war progressed, opportunities began to appear for British PSYOP broadcasts. The assassination attempt of Adolf Hitler provided an incredible angle for which to manipulate. During the aftermath of the assassination attempt, the programs emphasized and suggested that the plot was far larger than anyone in Germany had realized, and that the time was now to seize power and bring piece to Germany at last. The result was a deepening of the German ranks and a growing distrust for the Wehrmacht by the Nazi regime. 63 Such distrust is further evidenced by the secret Gestapo files that showed estimates of listenership rising from 1 million in 1941 to 15 million in 1944 with the penalty for being caught rising proportionally from being a 59 Michael Balfour. Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany. (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1979), Michael Balfour. Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany. (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1979), Ibid., Sefton Delmer. Black Boomerang (London: Secker and Warburg Ltd, 1962), Owen, David. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare (London: Crane Russak & Co. June 1979),

44 misdemeanor, to a felony, and then ultimately to death. Amazingly, even at the cost of death, the PSYOP stations increased their target audience by 1,500 percent. 64 Other evidence to the effectiveness of the broadcast can be measured by the extent to which the German broadcasters devoted themselves to answering both overt radio stations such as the BBC as well as clandestine radio stations, usually but by no means always saying where they came from. 65 One such radio station that was constantly challenged by the Germans was called Der Chief. The purpose of the black PSYOP station was to turn the ordinary fighting German against their Nazi leaders with programs meant create a rift within the ranks such as this excerpt: If it should be a question of choosing between Goering or Himmler, then, by God and all the saints, let us have 30,000 hundred-weight of Hermann, rather than one milligram of this scheming political out-house flower, of the anemic inflated windbag, Heinrich Himmler 66 As the tide started to turn against Germany, the British began culminating their PSYOP campaign that would further destabilize an already chaotic and war-torn Germany. At the request of Winston Churchill, PSYOP radio programming began targeting the civilian populace who were now stricken with strife and panic. In a radio program called Soldatensender Calais, the British began targeting civilians who were fleeing as fast as the German military via a massive wattage transmitter. The aim was to confuse the people by announcing false staging points and evacuation orders and thus clog the road arteries that were badly needed by the retreating German forces. Such confusion caused the German people to second guess the Nazi regime, and was further enforced by Soldatensender Calais rumors and gossip that portrayed German political and military leaders in a bad light. 67 During the closing months of the war, when the German populace was starved for information, the German radio stations would only play 64 Asa Briggs. The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Vol.2,(New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 34. The Golden Age of Wireless Volume 3 (New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, 67. The War of Words (New York, London: Oxford University Press, 1970, Michael Balfour. Propaganda, Policies and Publics in Britain and Germany (London: Routledge and Kegan 1979), Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). (April 20, 1943), Y3. 67 Lawrence C. Soley. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989),

45 classical music, failing to satisfy the demand for information. 68 The German populace then started to turn to whatever outlet for information that was available, and this source turned out to be Soldatensender Calais. After the war, a survey was conducted that found that 23 percent of respondents who had turned to a non-domestic German station had turned to the Saldatensender. 69 A campaign of this magnitude required technological innovation. In order to carry out the synchronized broadcasts across all the territory they needed to cover, the British purchased from the Americans an RCA 500,000 kilowatt mammoth Aspidistra. The Aspidistra was the largest transmitter ever built, and from the moment it started broadcasting, the entire countries of France and Germany could be reached. Additionally, all other stations near its bandwidth could be bled out at a time when a large transmitter was considered to range from 150,000 to 200,000 kilowatts. 70 Figure ,000 KW Aspidistra transmitter used against Germany Lawrence C. Soley. Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA subversive propaganda, (New York: Praeger Publishers 1989), Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), Psychological Warfare Department (PWD): Intelligence Section- Listening to Allied Radio Broadcasts by German Civilians Under the Nazis (June 5, 1945), Lerner, box 87, file David Owen. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare. (New York: Crane Russak & Co. June 1979), Robert Rowen. Gray and Black Propaganda Against Nazi Germany. Presented to the New York Military Affairs Symposium, 18 April Journal on-line. Available from Internet; accessed 4 December

46 In addition to the newly found broadcasting range, the British became extremely efficient in switching frequencies and cutting in on actual German radio stations, so that when signed off the air, the listeners could not discern between factual transmissions and enemy PSYOP. As soon as a German transmission was complete with an actual evacuation order, the Soldatensender team would then break in with false instructions with alternate gathering points. The final result of the programming had thousands of Germans on the roads of Germany making their way to fictitious rendezvous locations while impeding the movement of military units. By the war s end, Aspidistra would broadcasts on Radio Frankurts s frequency for several hours each day when the real station was silenced because of air raids. The fake broadcasts urged the citizens to evacuate as soon as possible or face death at the hands of the Allied war machine. 72 David Owen describes the situation at the wars end as Germany alive with frightened people, marching they knew not where. 73 The lessons of World War II illustrated superb PSYOP tactics that were implemented by Nazis with incredible success in France and the Low Countries. The British built on what the Germans started and soon began winning the air waves by imaginative programming that replicated host nation media and soon found its way into the actual host nation media of Germany itself. The PSYOP campaign by the British had been a critical factor in dismantling the German war machine. Additionally, the lessons of World War II showed that despite successes in manipulating and replicating host nation media, it can also be twisted and used against your own country as the Germans found out. C. THE KOREAN CONFLICT The Korean conflict had PSYOP advantages and disadvantages due to the exact culture and language shared by both North and South Korea. In South Korea, there were 72 The Psychological Warfare Division Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, An Account of its Operation in the Western European Campaign (Bad Homburg, Germany: SHAEF, October 1945), 55; Use of Aspidistra to Break Down German Resistance (January 19, 1945), JCS 1218/ 1, JCS, P.1: , The European Theater reel 11, nos ; Delmer, Sefton Black Boomerang, pp ; Charles Cruickshank, The Fourth Arm (London: Davis Poynter, 1977), David Owen. Battle of Wits: A Study of Deception in Warfare (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Crane Russak & Co. June 1979),

47 a plethora of host nation personnel and media that could be used against the North. However, the obvious disadvantage was the ability for the North to do exactly the same to the South. The majority of the PSYOP effort was concentrated on coercing and keeping support within North and South Korea respectively, and then transitioned into targeting enemy military forces. During the first five months of the war, enemy troops did not receive as much leaflet and broadcast attention as did the Republic of Korea civilians and soldiers; it was mainly PSYOP conducted on our allies to support their will to fight. 74 PSYOP operations by the U.S. military had screeched to a halt after the end of World War II as all military PSYOP units were completely disbanded. Far more significantly, PSYOP instruction were removed from the Army training curriculum, schools, and from Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). 75 By the start of the Korean War in 1950, the U.S. was scrambling to assemble a patchwork PSYOP program that would be needed for the conflict. The upstart Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) which consisted of only 6 personnel, slowly built to a staff of 35 personnel by the summer of By that time, millions of PSYOP leaflets were being delivered by aircraft and howitzers to target audiences of North Koreans, South Koreans, and Chinese forces that invaded the Korean peninsula. 77 From the start of the Korean War, U.S. PSYOP developed slowly and was generally unorganized, ad hoc, reactive, and was conducted with little host nation support. Target audiences were not well known, which meant that there was little knowledge about appropriate themes, symbols, cultural nuances, and susceptibilities of Koreans and Chinese alike. By the eve of the Korean War, a report on the status of 74 Korean War Leaflets box, USASOC Directorate of History and Museums, Evaluation and Analysis of Leaflet Program in the Korean Campaign, June-December 1950 (ORO, Washington: 23 January 1951), PSYWAR Administrative Office Records Branch, Record Group 319, Decimal File , entry 338, box 17, folder 314.7; K.K. Hansen, Psywar in Korea (Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington: Stephen Pease. PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole books), Herbert Friedman. The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line]; available from: Internet; accessed 23 January

48 PSYWAR stated that it was abundantly clear that the know how of PSYWAR, gained in World War II, had largely vanished and was not set forth in writing, but was locked up in the minds of operators who had gone back to civilian pursuits 78 Given these constraints, the U.S. effort concentrated mainly on the quantity as opposed to the quality of PSYOP products. The throw manure on the wall and hope it sticks mentality of developing PSYOP was the mantra from the beginning throughout midway through the war. Overall, very little thought was given to the PSYOP products as the push to get as many leaflets out was the order of the day. 79 During the early phases, the concentration of PSYOP was focused towards the South Korean populace and military due to the rapid push by the Communists. Many of the themes at the beginning of the war were aimed at convincing the South to hold on and to keep on fighting. 80 As the war went on, U.S. PSYOP efforts began to improve dramatically. A critical advance was the realization that surrender or defection was a sequential process. As a result, Figure 3. The UN Troops Treat Them Good M. Dyer, J. Segal, The POWWAR TMs: An Assessment of ORO PSYWAR Research (Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore: 13 June 1956), Herbert Freidman, The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line]; available from: Internet; accessed 23 January Stephen Pease. PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole books), th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 31

49 the themes of homesickness, loneliness, fear of death and safety like the leaflet below were used to soften up enemy troops for surrender. 82 Throughout the war, many of the millions of PSYOP leaflets that were being dropped on the enemy soon began to be augmented with limited radio broadcasts that utilized Koreans in the PSYOP effort. The first radio station was set up in the destroyed American embassy in Seoul on October 4, This station began its broadcasts with with General Douglas MacArthur's demand that Kim Il-Sung, the chief of the North Korean troops, surrender. As battle lines changed and the Korean War progressed, the station broadcast from mobile trucks and had many names such as: Radio Kilroy, Radio Vagabond, Radio Comet and Radio Mercury. 83 Such radio stations, albeit possessing a small daily broadcast cycle compared to the Soviets and the Chinese, along with the hundreds of millions of leaflets dropped began to have moderate success with getting North Koreans and Chinese to surrender. The Army contract study, PSYWAR in Korea, interrogated 2,728 POWs on one occasion; 904 claimed that PSYWAR print and broadcast were responsible for their surrender. A smaller sampling of 561 POWs reported that no less then 377 attributed to a PSYOP product or loudspeaker. 84 In fact PSYOP has been credited with over 100,000 Chinese and North Korean surrenders by the end of the war and one third of all POWs interviewed expressed that they had been influenced by UN PSYWAR 85 One major problem that affected PSYOP in Korea was the fluid battlefield. During the war, Seoul was captured twice as battle lines went back and forth. The effect was troublesome on the establishment of radio stations that needed static transmitters and antenna towers to operate. The problem was thus solved by utilizing mobile radio stations as the one pictured below that comprised of PSYOP personnel and host nation 82 Stanley Sandler. Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), Nick Grace. Investigative Report: Radio and U.S. Military PSYOPS, The Institute of Communications Studies, 11 February 1998 [Journal online] ; available from ; Internet; Accessed 2 December R.C. Sheldon and H. Senft, Preliminary Evaluations of Psywar Leaflets and Broadcasts from IPOR POW Interrogations, International Public Opinion Research, (Washington D.C.: 22 February 1951), Carl Berger. An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets (Washington D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, American University, 1959),

50 personnel to man the radio station. Perhaps the only drawback was the lack of continuity and stability that limited air time significantly. However, radio in Korea played a pivotal role due to the rates of illiteracy that was prevalent throughout the North Korean and Chinese ranks. It is estimated that 30% of the North Korean soldiers, based on POW camp observation were functionally illiterate, which obviously made PSYOP via radio a valuable commodity. 86 In reaction to the instability of the war front early on, PSYOP broadcasts were augmented by strategic broadcasts from Tokyo. Over 19 medium and shortwave broadcasters were being used to transmit PSYOP programs to Korea. With the infusion of host nation assets, personnel, and committed resources from the UN, broadcasts later in the war were considerably more sophisticated and ecumenical, adding cultural programs, commentaries, and even soap operas to their schedules. 87 Figure 4. The Army's Armed Forces Radio Service began as a mobile clandestine radio stations during the Korean War. 88 By April of 1952, three organizations were conducting PSYOP operations in the battle for Korea. Strategic PSYOP was conducted by the Psychological Warfare Section, GHQ, FECOM, in Tokyo. The Psychological Warfare Division, G-3, Eighth Army, eventually located in Seoul, conducted operational and tactical PSYOP with the help of 139 military, civilian and indigenous personnel (which included 10 professional Chinese 86 Stephen Pease. PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole books), Goerge S Pettee. Psywar Operations in the Korean War, Operations Research Office, (Fort McNair, Washington: 23 January 1951), Herbert Freidman, The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: Internet; accessed 23 January

51 and Korean translators and interviewers). 89 Consolidation activities (dissemination of war and morale news in an attempt to bring piece by convincing the populace to support their government) were conducted by the State Department s U.S. Information Service, based in Pusan. 90 Three of these PSYOP efforts utilized host nation personnel and assets, and were starting to have success against the North Koreans and Chinese. This is evidenced by increasing percentages of enemy POWs responding to PSYOP messages. As the war progressed and the Communists were driven north, further studies showed 68 percent of Chinese Communist and 65 percent of North Korean POWs responded that they had been influenced by U.S. PSYOP. Of the voluntary surrenders the figures were no less than 90 percent of the Chinese and 77 percent of the North Koreans. 91 Clearly the message was getting out on multiple levels while studies across the board were showing positive results. Additionally, in terms of operational PSYOP, the capture of Seoul boosted the tactical PSYOP programs in the mainland. One 50 kilowatt transmitter was broadcasting in the medium wave, a 10 kilowatt in the shortwave, and to reach Pyongyang, a 500 kilowatt transmitter was utilized to broadcast PSYOP messages. The lynchpin of the broadcasts was the successful application of host nation media personnel to such information platforms that the target audiences identified with. 92 In addition to radio broadcast, utilizing host nation media personnel also had a huge part in the millions of leaflets that were dropped in North and South Korea. As the war progressed, so did the effectiveness of leaflets that were dropped due to the influence of utilizing Korean and Chinese personnel. This was evidenced by the similar leaflets 89 Stanley Sandler. Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), Herbert Friedman, The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: Internet; accessed 23 January Memo, General McClure, R. to Comptroller of the Army, subject: Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare in Korea, HRC GEOG V, Korea, , (Washington D.C, Center of Military History 6 March 1952). 92 Herbert Friedman, The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: Internet; accessed 23 January

52 used against the UN personnel that were increasing in effectiveness and quality. 93 One leaflet that was directed at black soldiers was effective in terms of targeting the American vulnerability of inequality and race: LEST YOU FORGET!...Between January 1950 and June 1951, 85 negroes have been lynched in the United States.NEGRO SOLDIERS! You ve got a fight on your hands at home 94 Conversely, there were plenty of U.S. and UN PSYOP products that were unsuccessful due to the lack of cultural knowledge in producing them. An example was a leaflet produced for New Year s Eve 1952, showing a traditional Chinese family feast, with a ghost-like soldier at the table, and the caption Your place Will Be Empty. Americans with Chinese experience criticized the product due to the gross inaccuracies. The food was arranged in the wrong order, incorrect seating arrangements, the family would be too rich to have a son in the army, and the display of a bountiful feast was quite confusing. Additionally, the ghost was Caucasian in appearance. Such errors in products were immediately discredited by the enemy if the details were wrong, thus taking the seriousness immediately away from the product. It begs the question, would the Chinese really believe the entire concept and proposal of the product if the sender could not even get the minor details right? The answer is obviously no. Had the product been filtered through properly selected host nation personnel or cultural experts, the leaflet would have at the least gotten the point across and possibly be effective Stanley Sandler, Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) History Archives, Korean War Collection box (Fort Bragg, NC). 95 Radio, Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, List of the 1400 Most Frequently Used Chinese Characters (Tokyo: 1954 edition); Avedon, CCF Propaganda Man (May 1954),

53 Figure 5. (Your Place Will Be Empty) Korean War Leaflet Through trial and error, leaflets started to progress from standard behavior modification products to actual two sided newspaper clipping that provided objective and factual events concerning news about the Korean War as well as global news. Since reliable news was hard to come by, the leaflet newspaper was greatly received by the Communists forces. The most popular were the United Nations newspaper leaflets of: Parachute News, Free World News, Free World Weekly Digest, Free Korea, and Rehabilitation News. 97 Below is an example of a product containing objective news mixed with PSYOP. It reads: United Nations Troops Break Red Offensive, Red Timetables Falter, Red Troops Starving, UN Air Force Bolstered, and Netherlands to send Forces to Korea th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 97 Berger, Carl. An Introduction to Wartime Leaflets (Washington D.C.: Special Operations Research Office, American University) 1959,

54 Figure 6. Parachute News No. 11 Korea By the wars end, there were a thousand days of radio broadcasts, tens of thousands of loudspeaker appeals, and billions of PSYOP leaflets. Overall, historians have argued back in forth as to the effectiveness of PSYOP during the Korean War. There is no doubt that the brutal combat condition for the communists fighter coupled with PSYOP had an enormous effect on surrendering. Many surrendered because food was scarce, equipment was barely adequate, shelter and medical were practically nonexistent, and many soldiers pressed into combat were lonely, were missing their families, and did not know what they were fighting for. Soldiers would often eat their cotton from their medical kits and UN forces would be alarmed to see Korean and Chinese soldiers attack en masse without rifles in the hopes of picking one up from their dead comrades or enemy. 99 This led to staggering losses for the communists while providing an angle for PSYOP to exploit the themes of why they were fighting, and why were they dying for the Russians? 100 The extent to which the Koreans or Chinese adhered to the U.S. and UN PSYOP programs and campaigns is debatable due to all ambient factors related to combat, however the studies and polls throughout the war greatly supported the overall worth of PSYOP with the pillar being host nation support. The PSYOP campaigns combined American resources with Korean and Chinese culture and language that could be easily understood by the target audiences. As a result, the host nation assets added authenticity and relevance, as well as a greater chance of the products sinking in. 98 Radio, Broadcasting & Leaflet Group, List of the 1400 Most Frequently Used Chinese Characters [Tokyo: 1954 edition); Avedon, CCF Propaganda Man (May 1954), Pease, Stephen. PSYWAR: Psychological Warfare in Korea (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole books), Ibid.,

55 Overall, there is no doubt that Americans with very little language and knowledge of the Korean and Chinese culture could have had as much success had they not used host nation personnel and media assets. Such is evident by another final report that concluded: The amount of PW (PSYWAR) received by the target audienceappears to be a definite causal factor in producing disaffection behavior and willingness to surrender Psychological Warfareacting even without the favorable influences of lower moraleand lesser battle experience tends to influence disaffection behavior. 101 PSYOP was proven as a combat multiplier and paid for itself many times over. A study on the cost of prosecuting the Korean War determined that it took about $1,100- $1,200 to garner one POW by way of PSYWAR, contrasted to an Eighth Army estimate of $150,000 for each enemy soldier killed, a 70:1 ratio in favor of PSYWAR. 102 D. THE VIETNAM CONFLICT The 1960s and the Vietnam War are considered to be when radio, television and PSYOP truly converged. President Kennedy was a believer in "unconventional war," that is guerilla war, and as such he increased CIA funding to target Vietnam and Cuba as well as establishing the Green Berets. The war saw one of the most intensive PSYOP campaigns ever executed, far surpassing any PSYOP effort in World I, II, and Korea. 103 In World War II there were 1,000 personnel conducting PSYOP, in Korea there war 600 personnel with 130 host nation Koreans and Chinese. In Vietnam, the numbers ballooned to over 1,200 personnel and over 750 indigenous Vietnamese conducting PSYOP with an annual budget over 12 million dollars. 104 Additionally, because PSYOP was a priority with the Kennedy and Johnson administration, it became a priority with various inter- 101 Punturo and Wilmoore Kendall, Psychological Warfare Operations: Intelligence (ORO, Washington: 28 April 1952), Stanley Sandler. Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, page 253. Kilchoon Kim and E.A. Johnson, Evaluation of Effects of Leaflets o North Korean Prisoners of War (ORO, For Lesley J. McNair: 20 February 1951), Harry Latimer. Monogram on National Security Affairs, U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973), 3. It is noteworthy to mention that Harry Latimer was the first author to analyze and write about the aspects of psychological operations in Vietnam in Harry Latimer. Monogram on National Security Affairs, U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973),

56 agencies involved in PSYOP such as: the State Department, USAID (United States Agency for International Development), CIA, MACV (Military Assistance Command- Vietnam, and the USIA (United States Information Agency). 105 Essentially, the U.S. would not be caught with the abysmally low number of 6 personnel conducting PSYOP as in the start of Korean War. To coordinate all the agencies, President Johnson oversaw the development of the JUSPAO (Joint United States Public Affairs Office. The Chief of JUSPAO, Barry Zorthian, who was also the director of USIA, was appointed in May of His job was to upstart and promote the Government of Vietnam radio, TV, motion picture, information services, as well as his normal duties of directing the USIA with information and cultural programs. 106 On the South Vietnamese side, the government established the General political warfare directorate. However, there were problems from the start of the war. This was mainly due to differing priorities between South Vietnam and the U.S., questionable and corrupt personnel, as well as a fear that the Vietnamese had of being controlled by the U.S. Additionally, between 1964 and 1971, there were 12 different ministers of information in that time period. That created considerable problems with maintaining stability within the organization. As a result, the U.S. circumvented the Vietnamese government and began to engage the Vietnamese people on their own. 107 By 1966, the U.S. began to fund dissemination outlets for PSYOP by starting and funding a seven-station radio network in South Vietnam. When these transmitters were not being used to broadcast overt messages to the North, they were used to broadcast "black" clandestine stations that claimed to be from the Communists. A declassified interdepartmental task-force memo in 1966 argued for an increase in these broadcasts as well as all forms of media in order to "harass the Communists and to maintain (the anti- 105 Stanley Sandler, Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), Stanley Sandler, Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), Harry Latimer, Monogram on National Security Affairs, U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973),

57 Communist) morale of the North Vietnamese population. Additionally, the use of host nation personnel would be emphasized in bettering PSYOP products. 108 Just as in the author s experience in Iraq (OIF), host nation translators and journalists became extremely adept in the PSYOP development process because they did it on a daily basis. 109 In Vietnam, PSYOP leaflets with the exception of a few specialized ones were conducted by Vietnamese locals under the supervision of JUSPAO or the 4 th POG (Airborne). 110 The products were then checked by both U.S. and Vietnamese PYSOP officers for three basic criteria: 1) Does it follow present policy guidance, 2) Is it credible and culturally acceptable?, and 3) Is it grammatically correct and understandable? The final testing was with POWs or civilians who most closely approximated the target audience. 111 Overall, there is credible evidence that the system did keep PSYOP products consistent, concise, correct, and followed the guidance of JUSPAO. 112 However, most PSYOP efforts in the grand scheme were virtually ineffective due to the success of the NVA (North Vietnamese Army) and Viet Cong in dictating when and where they would fight. Additionally, when enemy forces did fight, seldom were the enemy pursued, thus enforcing the mentality of survivability within the enemy ranks, further decreasing the pressure to surrender. Additionally, the North Vietnamese conducted the most important type of PSYOP, face to face communication. While the 108 Lawrence C Soley, John S. Nichols. Clandestine Radio Broadcasting (Praeger. New York: 1987), It is inferred from reference material concerning host nation personnel in Vietnam, that many became very adept in the PSYOP development process; a parallel that I found consistent in Iraq as well. In regards to deploying and redeploying of PSYOP soldiers, often, the Iraqi translators provided stability, and advice from proven journalist were highly regarded and had substantial affect on the content of the products th POG (A), briefing (n.d.), RG 472, U.S. Army in Vietnam, Psywar and CA, box 1, 4th POG (A), folder; Army Regulation No , 20 November 1968, Psychological Operations: Pre-testing, Post-Testing, Evaluation and Review / Critique Procedures for Propaganda, ibid., box 17, 4th POG (A) S-1 folder. 111 Stanley Sandler, Cease Resistance: It s Good For You A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, page 290. Latimer, Harry, Monogram on National Security Affairs, U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam, (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973), th POG (A), briefing (n.d.), RG 472, U.S. Army in Vietnam, Psywar and CA, box 1, 4th POG (A), folder; Army Regulation No , 20 November 1968, Psychological Operations: Pre-testing, Post-Testing, Evaluation and Review / Critique Procedures for Propaganda, ibid., box 17, 4th POG (A) S-1 folder. 40

58 U.S. and South Vietnamese were busy producing and delivering billions of leaflets, and hundreds of thousands of magazines, newspapers, posters, broadcasts, pamphlets, et al, the Viet Cong were executing the tactics of Mao; 113 going from hamlet to hamlet to indoctrinate the local populace while establishing a presence that was coercive in nature. 114 Overall, the lack of success that PSYOP had, was not because of the actual PSYOP being ineffective, it was rather that the enemy was not convinced that the PSYOP messages were credible due to the their success in the jungles and tunnels of Vietnam as well as coercing the local populace to support them and replenish their ranks. 115 The politics that inhibited attacks on North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia allowed the enemy safe haven without the fear of ground pursuit or air attacks. The North Vietnamese, because they could pick and choose when and where they wanted to fight, did not have to suffer though constant barrages, continuous attacks, and the everyday battlefield elements that put American PSYOP at an immediate advantage in previous wars. By the wars end, the amount of enemy personnel that had surrendered to the Americans and South Vietnamese was miniscule in both actual numbers and in comparison to the surrender numbers that the U.S. had enjoyed in previous wars. 116 In contrast, it was the North Vietnamese who delivered a more lethal psychological blow due to the overwhelming effects of the PSYACTS (Psychological Acts) produced by U.S. personnel killed and the tactical disaster but strategic success of the Tet Offensive in Tet caught the Americans completely by surprise and 113 Mao Zedong who influenced Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, Che Gueverra, Abe Mel Guzman and other revolutionaries was instrumental in developing guerrilla warfare from the concept of indoctrinating the populace in the rural areas while slowly building support in an eventual mass uprising against a particular government. Such irregular warfare would involve asymmetrical attacks from insurgents that would eventually tax the state and result in it s collapse. 114 Harry Latimer Monogram on National Security Affairs, U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI, 1973), The Battle for Hue, Vietnam. Military Channel, (Television Documentary, 2007). Viewed 26 January Stephen T. Hosmer The Information Revolution and Psychological Effects. Rand Institute Journal, March 1996 [Journal online]; available from ; Internet; accessed online 12 December The Battle for Hue, Vietnam. Military Channel, (Television Documentary, 2007). Viewed 26 January

59 resulted in several key towns such as Hue being overrun by the North. The offensive opened up with 84,000 North Vietnamese and VC attacking isolated border areas of Con Thien, Loc Ninh, Dak To, Khe Sanh and then evolved into attacks upon 60 district cites throughout Vietnam. Khe Sanh was particularly riveting because many observers remarked on its similarity to the siege of the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu. 118 However, after a few days in some cites and several weeks in others, the Americans and South Vietnamese forces began to overtake them after bitter fighting. In Saigan, which until Tet had been impervious to the war, enemy suicide squads delivered crippling blows to government installations. The once quiet city of Hue was the most effected by the Tet offensive with over 3,000 of its residents massacred by the North Vietnamese. 119 By the end of February 1968, the North Vietnamese were soundly defeated. The North had sustained a staggering 40,000 casualties compared to 500 for the Americans and South Vietnamese combined. General Westmoreland had announced that the Communists were defeated and that nowhere in Vietnam did the occupants of the invaded cities welcome the North as liberators. 120 But there were other consequences that would be strategic in scope that would forever change the perception of the war. For one, the offensive added six hundred thousand more people in the South to the rolls of refugees. The most severe was the perception of the war within the United States. Over the previous year, President Johnson had reassured the American public that the Communists forces were defeated did not pose an invading threat to the South, and were firmly in command of the tempo of the war. Now the war pictures (like the two below) and footage transmitted into American living-rooms of combat in the embassy garden, several hundred Americans killed, a war spiraling out of control, as well as doubts about the administration s claims of military progress. 121 Finally, in demonstration of how thoroughly the message had penetrated American consciousness, following the Tet Offensive on 27 February 1968, Walter Cronkite closed with: "Report from Vietnam: 118 Joel Myerson, U.S. Army in Vietnam, Images of a Lengthy War (Washington D.C. Center of Military History United States Army, 1990), Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,

60 Who, What, When, Where, Why?" He expressed his view to the nation that the war was un-winnable, and that the United States would have to find a way out. 122 Figure 7. (American casualty at Khe Sanh and an execution of a Viet Cong). 123 At Tet, Ho Chi Minh had essentially turned a devastating tactical and operational defeat into a strategic psychological victory. He benefited from the Western press covering the offensive and utilized the American host nation media to deliver constant psychological barrages to the American public. Such images became the focal point for protests throughout college campuses, raised doubts among ordinary American citizens, placed a considerable amount of political pressure to begin withdrawing from Vietnam, and ended the credibility of President Johnson and his chance for a second term. 124 Worse off, the images from the home-front had a psychological effect on the average 18 year old who was just doing his or her duty. Lastly, it made psychological operations in Vietnam even more challenging then it ever had been because of the enemies benefit from strategic PSYOP. It is ironic that in Korea, a small scale PSYOP operation was able to have success due to cold, exposed, battle ravaged, and starving North Koreans and Chinese. In Vietnam, a large scale PSYOP operation did not have the battlefield conditions to 122 Daniel Hallin. Vietam on Television, Museum of Broadcast Communication, n.d. [Journal online]; available from Internet; accessed 23 January These are two examples of the many images that were seen throughout the world. The picture on the right is by Eddie Adams of the Associated Press. The photograph is the execution of a Viet Cong Lieutenant by Vietnam s National Police Chief, Nguyen Ngoc Loan. The picture won a Pulitzer Prize. 124 Joel Myerson. U.S. Army in Vietnam, Images of a Lengthy War (Washington D.C. Center of Military History United States Army, 1990),

61 capitalize on because the battle space involved the hamlets and villages of Vietnam which the North could easily manipulate. 125 Most importantly, the dominance of strategic PSYOP by the NVA and VC diminished the U.S. will to fight on a national level. Amazingly, staggering losses and a decisive defeat for the Communists was enough to produce a strategic PSYOP effect that influenced the war; this was evidenced by Johnson placing a ceiling on troop levels as well as de-escalating the air campaign in North Vietnam. 126 Regardless of the strategic psychological boost that Tet gave to the North, an enormous amount of resources, manpower, and host nation personnel contributed to many successful U.S. PSYOP programs that were very effective in themselves on a tactical and operational level, even if they failed to turn the tide and help the U.S. win the larger conflict. An example is the amount of surrenders of VC and NVA soldiers in under the Chieu Hoi surrender program. It is estimated that 29,276 NVA / VC (the equivalent of 95 infantry battalions) surrendered to MACV or ARVN forces. At the time, MACV estimated that eliminating an equivalent force via conventional means would have cost the U.S. 6,000 dead and many more wounded. 127 Such successes of the Chieu Hoi programs were from millions of PSYOP leaflets, PSYOP loudspeaker teams with host nation translators, as well as radio and TV programs. However, JUSPAO quickly realized that radio was limited because there were parts of Vietnam where the populace did not possess radios much less TVs. There needed to be diversity within the PSYOP mediums as opposed to just dumping millions of leaflets throughout the countryside due to the civilians and the Communists military forces being inextricably intertwined. In other words a friendly villager by day could be 125 The Battle for Hue, Vietnam. Military Channel, (Television Documentary, 2007). Viewed 26 January Phillip Davidson. (MG, USA, Retired). Vietnam at War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), Paul Valley (COL U.S Army). From PSYOP to Mind War, (Presidio of San Francisco, CA: Headquarters 7 th PSYOP Group, United States Army Reserve), page 4. Chieu Hoi The Winning Ticket. MACV Command Information Pamphlet, 6-69, March

62 a VC who launches mortar rounds at U.S. camps by night. It was necessary to maximize all means of communication to get a repetitive pro U.S. and pro South Vietnamese message to as many civilians as possible. 128 One solution was to provide thousands of radios and television sets that would be set to South Vietnamese radio stations such as Voice of Freedom (Tiêng Nói Tu Do), Mother of Vietnam ((Me Viêt Nam), and the Sacred Sword of Patriotism ((Gýõm Thiên Ái Quôc). 129 The radios would then be air dropped, floated down rivers, distributed throughout the major cities, and would contain PSYOP material to convince the local populace that the radios were not harmful or contained explosives per the North Vietnamese. One example of this campaign can be found in the leaflet reproduced below: This girl is picking up the white package containing a radio from the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. She is not afraid to pick it up because she knows the radio will bring her and her family knowledge and entertainment. 130 Figure 8. Leaflet HQ The distribution of radios was a clever move by the Americans because it gave the target audiences a voice from their countrymen. Radio soon began to play PSYOP messages to 95% of the country around the clock. The Americans tapped into the U.S. funded local radio stations and began utilizing them as a medium for deploying PSYOP 128 Stanley Sandler. Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999), Herbert Freidman, The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: ; Internet; accessed 23 January Ibid. 131 Ibid. 45

63 messages. Essentially, the American PSYOP personnel would formulate the direction and campaign, and the Vietnamese would provide the on air voice and personality as pictured below. 132 Figure 9. PSYOP radio broadcast in Vietnam. 133 Throughout the war, a number of Allied radio stations broadcast messages throughout Vietnam. The Ministry of Defense in Saigon operated the Voice of Freedom with transmitters in Hue. The Americans provided financial, technical and advisory assistance to the Vietnamese broadcasters. Some other stations broadcasting to the Vietnamese were Radio Saigon, the Voice of America, and the British Broadcasting Corporation. 134 In addition to the use of radio stations, PSYOP programs capitalized on the vulnerabilities of the Vietnamese culture such as messages that emphasized superstitions. 135 In the Vietnamese culture, one such superstition was the belief in the wandering soul. The Vietnamese believe that the dead must be buried in their homeland, or their soul will wander aimlessly in pain and suffering. According to these beliefs, if a person is improperly buried, his or her soul wanders constantly. During the war, an attempt was made to use this belief against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Since 132 Harry Latimer. Monogram on National Security Affairs, U.S. Psychological Operations in Vietnam (Brown University, Providence, RI), Herbert Friedman, The American PSYOP Organization During the Korean War, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: ; Internet; accessed 23 January th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 135 PSYOP-POLWAR News Letter, 30 November

64 it was clear that they would die far from home, their bodies would probably never be found or properly buried, it was certain that they would become a wandering soul after death. 136 The operation was code-named "Wandering Soul." Engineers spent weeks recording eerie sounds. They were similar to the sounds employed during a scary radio show or movie; they were very creepy and designed to send shivers down the back. These cries and wails were intended to represent souls of the enemy dead who had failed to find the peace of a proper burial. The wailing soul cannot be put to rest until this proper burial takes place. The purpose of these sounds was to panic and disrupt the enemy and cause him to flee his position. 137 Helicopters were used to broadcast Vietnamese voices pretending to be from beyond the grave. They called on their "descendents" in the Vietcong to defect and cease fighting. This campaign played the sounds and messages all night in order to spook the superstitious enemy. Despite eventually realizing that they were hearing a recording beamed from a helicopter, the enemy gunners could not help but fear that their souls would some day end up moaning and wailing in a similar fashion after death. 138 {Funeral Music and the Wailing Sounds of a Moaning Ghost} {The Daughter "Hai" Crys Out for Her Father} Daddy, daddy, come home with me, come home. Daddy! Daddy! {The Ghost Father Responds}! Hai! Who is that? Who is calling me? My daughter? My wife? Your Father is back home with you, my daughter Your Husband is back home with you, my wife But my body is gone. I am dead, my family 136 Herbert Friedman. The Wandering Soul, - Vietnam Psychological Operations (PSYOP), n.d.; [Article on-line]; available from: Internet; accessed 23 January PSYOP Policy Number 36, JUSPAO, (Saigon, Vietnam: 10 May 1967). 138 Herbert Freidman. The Wandering Soul, - Vietnam Psychological Operations (PSYOP), n.d.; [Article on-line]; available from: Internet; accessed 23 January

65 Tragic... how tragic My friends, I come back to let you know that I am dead... I am dead I am in Hell... just Hell It was a senseless death. How senseless... how senseless But when I realized the truth, it was too late... too late Friends... while you are still alive... There is still a chance that you can be reunited with your loved ones Do you hear what I say? Go home... Go home friends Hurry... If not, you will end up like me Go home my friends before it is too late Go home!... Go home friends!! Ve Di!...! Ve Di Ban!!! VE DI!!...!! VE DI!! {More Moans From the Afterlife} 139 Like similar PSYOP programs and campaigns, the use of host nation personnel was the critical lynchpin in delivering a product that really hit home and delivered an instant connection to the target audience. Below are some of the translators and radio journalists that worked on The Wondering Soul project. Figure 10. Vietnamese Journalist produce The Wondering Soul recordings USASOC History Archives, Vietnam War Collection. Fort Bragg, NC, th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 48

66 As The Wondering Soul project took hold, a common occurrence happened every time the recordings were played, it always drew enemy gunfire. In Vietnam, drawing enemy gunfire was one of the most difficult things to achieve because the enemy was trained to fire when it favored them the most. However, The Wondering Soul recordings made them fire out of emotion and fear, which is just what the U.S. military in the air and ground wanted. An excerpt from an AC-130 Specter Gunship (Spooky) crewmember who flew with an accompanying C-47 stated that: we stumbled on to a Battalion-sized Viet Cong force and they were bold enough open fire when they heard the recordings. Of course that was what we wanted. Over the Commanding Officer s objection I scheduled our C-47 for a repeat visit over the same target. The next night they went up again, but what I wasn t told until later was that Spooky went along with our aircraft and flew the speaker mission in opposing orbit and all blacked out. When our aircraft played the recording, the ground fire erupted again and Spooky hosed em with all three cannon in full cyclic rpm. 141 Another excerpt from an unknown VC stated: these audio messages were hard to ignore, for the sound even penetrated through the earth to VC hidden in the underground tunnels. 142 This was considered a positive MOE since it effected the behavior and decision cycle of the target audience by causing them to go against his normal routine of firing at the Americans when it best suited them. Instead, the PSYOP message elicited an emotional response that caused them to fire at the Americans only to be decimated by patrolling AC-130s with their counter fire. 143 Like The Wondering Soul project, there were thousands of other PSYOP programs during the long conflict in Vietnam, and like most military operations in Vietnam, went through its trials and errors as well. However, PSYOP alone was not destined to win the Vietnam Conflict. As effective as many of the PSYOP programs were in meeting their specific goals, in order to affect the larger war effort, they needed to play off of the situation happening on the ground. In this case, the war on the ground th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 142 Duane Yeager. Winning Vietnamese Minds was what the U.S. Army s 4 th Psychological Operations Group was all about, Vietnam. December 1990), th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 49

67 failed to disrupt the North Vietnamese from controlling the battlefield and gaining support from the Vietnamese populace. The end result was a populace that became coerced and institutionalized by the Communists forces exacerbated by the U.S. refusal to break the cycle of support coupled with a media nightmare that crippled America s resolve to continue the war. Naturally, PSYOP would then be relegated to convincing hardened soldiers and a controlled populace to an unrealistic alternative. However, despite the un-permissive environment, PSYOP programs as a whole, made the most of what they could and incorporated host nation assets with much success. In turn the use of host nation assets gave PSYOP its greatest posture for success in Vietnam. 144 E. OPERATION DESERT STORM Operation Desert Storm introduced a new element into the PSYOP world: it was the first war to be covered on a global scale, 24 hours a day. Such news coverage turned certain aspects of host nation media upside down by the mere aspect that local news could become global news in a flash. This put the news media as a major player in the conflict and instantly placed the war in a media fishbowl with the eyes of the world watching. Both Iraq and the U.S. saw the news media as an arm to their strategic PSYOP reach due to the coverage that it commanded. In the months preceding as well as during the conflict, both Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and U.S. officials used CNN as somewhat of a diplomatic back channel, sending complex signals to each other and to their respective publics at the same time. 145 This resulted in a high stakes media chess game with PSYOP being a major force provider in all phases: strategic, operational, and tactical. The effectiveness of PYSOP during Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was made evident by its dramatic effect that spurned many of the enemy soldiers to surrender. The images were then seen on news footage around the world of scores of Iraqis with their hands raised, with many holding PSYOP leaflets. PSYOP was used so effectively during the Gulf War that an estimated 87,000 Iraqi soldiers 144 Paul Valley (COL U.S Army), From PSYOP to Mind War, (Presidio of San Francisco, CA: Headquarters 7 th PSYOP Group, United States Army Reserve, 1983), L.A. Friedland Democracy, Diversity, and Cable: The Case of CNN. (University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1991). 50

68 surrendered. 146 However, PSYOP alone was not the reason that thousands of soldiers surrendered. Instead, PSYOP was the tipping point, that extra edge that forced enemy soldiers that were exposed to horrendous barrages from U.S. military platforms to surrender. Unlike Vietnam, where the enemy was afforded safe haven both politically and geographically, Iraqi soldiers were exposed in the open desert to be picked off systemically by massive firepower from coalition forces. However, the success of PYSOP was not merely happenstance, it was precipitated by a PYSOP force structure that was deployed to the region far before hostilities commenced. 147 With the U.S. being caught unprepared for PSYOP in previous engagements, the 4th PSYOP Group was deployed to the Gulf region to avoid such a similar mistake. As quickly as 11 August 1990, nine days after the invasion of Iraq, a cell of 12 PSYOP specialists, under the supervision of the commander of the 4 th POG (A), COL Anthony Normand, assembled at MacDill AFB, Florida, the headquarters of the joint services U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to commence strategic PSYOP planning for possible operations in Southwest Asia. The coordinated PSYOP plan took into account the cultures, languages, and sensibilities of the people of Southwest Asia. Such planning ahead paid dividends because it also prepared and coordinated for host nation media support that would be advising U.S. forces on leaflets, various print products, as well as arranging host nation personnel to broadcast PSYOP messages via television and radio. 148 However, Saddam Hussein quickly gained the momentum on strategic PSYOP after requested PSYOP directives specified by General Norman Schwarzkopf were categorically denied by various agencies and staffing bureaucracy within DoD due to sensitivities to Coalition partners. Schwarzkopf s patience was wearing thin as he stated th PSYOP Group Estimate. PSYOP MOE (Fort Bragg, NC, 10 October 1991). 147 USASOC, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational Analsis, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 2-5 to Stanley Sandler. Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999, 332. USASOC, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational Analysis, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), 2-5 to

69 rather pointedly on 20 December 1990 that Psychological Operations are going to be absolutely critical, critical part of any campaign that we must get involved in. 149 Precious weeks and months passed as Saddam Hussein soon began disseminating his own strategic PSYOP as well as trying to convince his fellow Middle Eastern countries that the invasion was another example of an infidel crusade. His strategic PSYOP had considerable success in mounting a campaign that reached a wide domestic and foreign audience. 150 Within Iraq, all broadcast facilities were owned and operated by the Broadcasting and Television Organization of the MCI. Prior to the invasion, Iraqi broadcast capabilities included two prime-time television broadcasts, two domestic radio services Baghdad Domestic Service and Voice of the Masses (VOM) and shortwave radio broadcasts of VOM in Kurdish, Turkoman, and Assyrian. 151 Shortly after the invasion, Iraq seized several Kuwaiti media centers and began operating the Provisional Free Kuwait Government Radio Program. They also implemented at least five additional shortwave radio programs destined to undermine the Saudi and Egyptian governments and the morale of Arab troops in the Gulf. However, coalition bombing raids soon started attacking the communication nodes of Iraq which completely destroyed their television capability as well as leaving Iraq with only two radio stations at reduced signal strength. 152 Ever relentless, the Iraqis began to turn to foreign resources to get their message out. The Iraqis aired clips via ARABSAT and INTELSAT as giving feeds to the international media via the Iraqi News Agency (INA). Additionally, Iraq invested in controlling media resources such as the Voice of Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the news agency Jana. The result led to rallying officials of Palestine, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen, Mauritania, and Sudan to issue a 149 Introduction to PSYOP Slides PSYOP Officers Course (Fort Bragg, NC 5 January 2004). USSOC, Psychological Operations, 4-1; (U) USSOCOM Classified Briefing (S), n.d., J-28. Info used was from instructional reference material Unclassified. 150 Richard Blair (MSG Retired), Goldstein, Frank L (COL Retired). Psychological Operations, Principles and Case Studies: The Iraqi Propaganda Network. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1996), Ibid. 152 Ibid. These five shortwave radio programs were Holy Mecca Radio, first observed on 10 August 1990; Voice of the Egypt of Arabism, first observed on 11 August 1990; Voice of the Peninsula and the Arabian Gulf, implemented on 29 August 1990; Voice of Peace, implemented on 11 September 1990; and Voice of Arab Awakening, first observed on 13 October

70 joint statement endorsing the Iraqi position as well as organized ways to counter the Coalition s media. 153 At first, Iraq s strategic PSYOP scheme was highly imaginative and did have some success. Iraq s use of PSYOP and the world media painted Iraq as a formidable foe. This led to an overestimation of Allied casualties that were far off the mark. 154 For all of Iraq s successes in PSYOP at the start, they were slowly eroded by a series of mistakes that became laughable items throughout the world. Iraq s version of Tokyo Rose would broadcasts that the wives of American soldiers were having an affair with the likes of Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and Bart Simpson. 155 Reacting to the ridiculous broadcasts, The British newspaper The Guardian wrote in 1991: BAGHDAD BETTY, Iraq's English-language radio service, has taken a credibility nosedive. Over the weekend Betty indulged in some mischievous bitchery by telling US soldiers that their wives back home were committing adultery by sleeping with movie stars. Big-screen heartthrobs like Tom Cruise, Arnold Schwarzenegger and Bart Simpson. The first two might have presented some cause for anxiety, but who initiated the deviant practice of molesting under-age, primary coloured cartoon characters? Three months later, Baghdad Betty would be sacked after she became the object of laughter and ridicule throughout the media world. The Iraqis continued to make further mistakes in their attempt to win the hearts and minds of the CNN audience. On 23 August 1990, Saddam went on television with a young child named Stuart who was being held hostage during the Coalition bombing. Saddam thought that it showed his fatherly side. Americans and British viewers were incensed that he would use and frighten a child, and the Kuwaiti government-in-exile immediately prepared a brochure comparing Saddam with WWII photographs of Adolf Hitler in a similar fatherly pose. Besides the 153 Ibid., Ibid., Introduction to PSYOP Slides PSYOP Officers Course (Fort Bragg, NC 5 January 2004). 53

71 photograph of Saddam with the hostage, the brochure also depicted dead Shi ite and Kurdish children, the destruction of buildings in Kuwait, and other illustrations of Iraqi inhumanity. 156 Figure 11. Similar depiction between Hitler and Hussein 157 Soon the Coalition forces were winning on three fronts: the lack of Iraqi credibility, the un-defendable Iraqi position of plundering Kuwait, and the sudden rise of the patriotic media in the United States. 158 The U.S. benefited tremendously from a media that was friendly while demonizing Saddam Hussein at the same time. The major syndicates showed video postcards from the war front- smiling soldiers sending love kisses to moms, dads, and girlfriends, as well as holiday greetings. Magazines and tabloids were equally patriotic. A New York Post headline read: UP YOURS. Newsweek s read: BAGHDAD S BULLY and the New York Times, of all newspapers, ran a special supplement of two African-American soldiers embracing, with one holding an American 156 Herbert Friedman, PSYWAR Mistakes, 18 January 2006; [Article on-line];available from: Internet; accessed 23 January th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Historical Archives (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 158 Kalb, Marvin. Taken By Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War (New York: Bantam 2004), 23. The Patriotic media has been described as jingoistic coverage of a popular war. Kalb asserts that the press during DESERT STORM was in reaction to the image that the press lost the war in Vietnam. Kalb contends that the media covered by most anchors, retired Generals, and Admirals were too war friendly in DESERT STORM and this aided the Coalition tremendously. 54

72 flag. The cumulative effect of such coverage was indicative to the war s popularity of 89% among the American populace. 159 This gave the Coalition a tremendous advantage because not one of the media sources would dare question the administration or the way in which the war was prosecuted. Seizing upon the information initiative of the media, the 4th PSYOP Group began broadcasting the "VOICE OF THE GULF" (VOG) radio network on 19 January The VOG was a 100 man cell comprised of 8 th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (A), British, Egyptian, and Kuwaiti representatives whose first mission was to encourage Iraqi line crossers. 160 It operated continuously through 1 April 1991 with more than 210 hours of live broadcasting and 330 hours of prerecorded programs. A total of 2,072 news items were aired along with 189 PSYOP messages. The VOICE OF THE GULF network consisted of a 50 KW AM transmitter located at Abu Ali, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on AM 1134; a 10KW AM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on AM 1179; a 1KW FM transmitter located at Qaisumah, Saudi Arabia broadcasting on FM 87.5 and two Volant Solo EC-130 aircraft of the 193rd Special Operations Wing broadcasting on AM 690 and FM 88.5 and Reports from Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) after the conflict were encouraging. Most believed it was a true Arabic radio station that encouraged them to surrender, and the VOG was the third most listened to radio station behind the BBC and Radio Monte Carlo. 162 Throughout the war the PSYOP radio programs were produced with the assistance of Kuwaiti exiles and Saudi Arabians, and shared transmitting facilities with two Armed Forces Desert Network radio station vans that broadcast to U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the U.S. Army and CIA helped to set up the radio stations: The Future and The Iraqi Broadcasting Corporation; two stations developed with host 159 Ibid. 160 USACAPOC, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational Analysis, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), USACAPOC, Psychological Operations During Desert Shield / Storm: A Post Operational Analysis, 2d ed., revised (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: 5 November 1993), Ibid. 55

73 nation assets that also continued broadcasting long after Desert Storm. 163 The audio and visual PSYOP programs drove home what the Iraqi soldiers were experiencing on the ground: destruction from Coalition ground forces, destruction from the air, most communication nodes destroyed, contributing to a sense that the situation was hopeless. US PSYOP messages sought to capitalize on the reality that the Iraqis experienced, driving it home with visuals such as the one below. Figure 12. Iraqis Surrendering. 164 Use of host nation media was not limited to just broadcasting. It was imperative that the Iraqi soldier and citizen be familiar with the visual products that they would encounter. Drawings and pictures have uniqueness to themselves in the Middle East that is quite distinctive from Western illustration. To provide such an effect, the Coalition hired the Saudi Royal illustrator and well known cartoonists to draw leaflets that were then double checked by the Arab member of the Combined PSYOP cell. 165 Such leaflets were then delivered to enemy soldiers and civilians in the millions. The leaflets ranged from standard surrender pleas, brotherhood, or the inevitability of destruction if they continued to fight. However, at no time did any PSYOP product in any form denigrate the Iraqi soldiers. Learning from past mistakes in Vietnam, as well as past foes of the U.S. who denigrated the American fighting soldier, the U.S. portrayed the Iraqi soldier as 163 Nick Grace. Investigative Report: Radio and U.S. Military PSYOPS, The Institute of Communications Studies, 11 February 1998 [Journal online] ; available from ; Internet; Accessed 2 December USSASOC History Archives (Fort Bragg, NC: 2004). 165 USSASOC History Archives (Fort Bragg, NC: 2004). 56

74 a brave good soldier that was led astray by the evil Saddam and who would be treated with dignity and respect upon leaving the one-sided fight. 166 Figure 13. Smiling Iraqi EPW; Surrender campaign leaflet. 167 As short as the Gulf War was, it solidified the use of host nation media assets due to the lack of Arabic linguists in DoD and the U.S. Government. Many Iraqis felt that listening to Arabic broadcasts that foretold their doom while bombs were raining from the sky was the worst morale killer they had faced. The final analysis was quite telling. Overall, Coalition leaflet messages had gone out to 98 percent of the EPWs, 80 percent of whom had been influenced by it, and 70 percent of the EPWs had been influenced enough that it affected their surrender decision. Radio gained 58 percent target exposure rate, of which 46 percent found it persuasive and 34 percent claimed it had a bearing on the surrender decision. 168 F. THE BALKANS During the tumultuous period in the Balkans in the 1990s, hate was used as a catalyst to motivate people, while the use of host nation media was at the center. According to U.S. embassy staff, Slobodan Milosevic had used the state controlled media to inflame Serbian Christians against the Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo. According to U.S. embassy staff, Serb soldiers began committing crimes because of the daily broadcast 166 Sandler, Stanley, Cease Resistance: It s Good For You : A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 1999, USSASOC History Archives (Fort Bragg, NC: 2004). 168 USSASOC History Archives (Fort Bragg, NC: 2004). 57

75 of the manufactured atrocities of the Bosnian Muslims, provoking a desire among the Serb population to exact revenge. Such fabricated stories tore into the core of the Serb populace by reporting exaggerated stories such as Muslims raping nuns and killing babies. Slowly and methodically, the media was being used to enrage the Serbians and justify the ensuing genocide against Bosnians. 169 During the Kosovo Conflict, the U.S. intensified the pressure on the Serbs by initiating a series of sanctions that included economic, diplomatic and ultimately - military action. All three foreign policy alternatives were covered extensively by the news media. In fact, the U.S. instituted the most concentrated media focus directed toward a single foreign country in its entire history. Essentially, the media became a major partner to the military, economic, and diplomatic efforts that would ultimately win the Kosovo campaign. 170 Since 1943, the U.S. had been utilizing host nation media and broadcasting in the Balkans as a media counter during World War II against the Nazi, the Cold War against the Eastern Bloc nations, and now against a Serb government determined to bring genocide to the Balkans. At the center was the VOA (Voice of America) and RFE / RL (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty that began broadcasting 40 hours of shortwave programming in Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian, and Serbian. However, since hostilities escalated, Milosevic began to shut down access to the local affiliates. To counter, the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and NATO forces that consisted of: the U.S., Germany, UK, Romania, Turkey, Italy, France, Spain, and Poland stepped in and expanded the shortwave, medium wave, and internet transmissions in their specific assigned sectors of Kosovo. 171 The result became known as the ring of fire around Serbia: Multinational Brigade Northeast (MNB-NE), Multi-national Brigade East, Multi-National Brigade 169 Edward Kaufman. A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars : A Washington Quarterly Reader. The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks. Ed. by Alexander T. J. Lennon. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England. 2003), Ibid., Peter Beschnidt (LTC, German Army). NATO Psychological Operation brief. (Raleigh, NC: 2004 World Wide PSYOP Conference, 20 November 2004),

76 Southwest (MNB-SW), and Headquarters KFOR (HQ KFOR). 172 In producing such a ring of fire within Kosovo, Milosevic unwittingly helped the Coalition when he shut down the local affiliates. The result was a clearing of the airwaves and made transmission into the region much less difficult. 173 Soon a convergence of NATO countries began assembling an information campaign aimed at gaining support from the Serb populace and ultimately overthrowing Milosevic per the intent of the leaflet below. Figure 14. Leaflet 04-B-02-L War and sacrifice for you Good money for him, his family and his friends. Serbia's economy is crippled; her war machine under attack. but through it all, Milosevic, his family, and his inner circle have managed to make millions. Tight control of state-run monopolies has given Milosevic an illicit financial empire at the expense of those he claims to defend. His son Marko waits out the war in comfort. He does not serve as ordinary Serbs must. While your sons and husbands fight, Marko Milosevic parties in Belgrade or works on his sun-tan at the family villa in the Mediterranean. Milosovic's nepotism, cronyism, and genocide in Kosovo have drained Serbia's economic resources and dragged the country into war with the world. Is he the kind of leader you really want? Edward Kaufman. A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars : A Washington Quarterly Reader. The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks. Ed. by Alexander T. J. Lennon. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England. 2003), Steven Collins. Shaping Perceptions During the Latest Balkans Imbroglio : Submitted for Publication Consideration to European Security. 30 May Peter Beschnidt (LTC, German Army). NATO Psychological Operation brief. (Raleigh, NC: 2004 World Wide PSYOP Conference, 20 November 2004), NATO Leaflet 04-B-02-L005. February Pristina, Kosovo. 59

77 The challenge of overthrowing the Milosevic government meant conducting an extensive information campaign aimed at breaking support or indifference amongst the populace. Working in concert with each other, the NATO counties worked with their respective host nation personnel in the form of journalists, broadcasters, music disk jockeys, translators, and cultural advisors. The results were products and programs that were specific for the region, and specifically for the cultural make-up within their sector. Translators and journalists were also used in leaflet operations that consisted of over 100 million being dropped on the Kosovo populace. However, PSYOP in Kosovo had negligible effects at the beginning of the conflict. Most notably, the Kosovo air campaign was used by Milosevic as a propaganda boost due to the unavoidable collateral damage as well as the unfortunate and embarrassing incident of the bombing of the Chinese embassy. 176 Additionally, the mass of cultures that consisted of the UN meant a mass of psychological products that ranged from being effective, ineffective, and even counter productive. 177 Despite the initial challenges, NATO did have a vast swath of visual, audio visual, and audio that dominated the information spectrum within Kosovo. Additionally, just as in the case of DESERT STORM, the world media that was also being watched by Serbians, was demonizing the Milosevic government for its acts of atrocities as well as showing the unforgettable images of women and children helplessly fleeing towards Albania. 178 Once NATO established their perimeter boundaries, momentum in information operations began to take hold. Susceptibilities, vulnerabilities, and cultural nuances became evident as well as an aggressive strategy that began to take hold to meet politicians, businessmen, station directors, newspaper outlets and various key communicators within their sector. It was clearly evident, that the key to successful PSYOP in Kosovo was convincing the Serbians that the atrocities committed by the Milosevic regime were inhumane and blatantly wrong. Additionally, a key PSYOP 176 NATO Leaflet 04-B-02-L005. February Pristina, Kosovo. 177 Ibid. 178 During the time, the impact of CNN and BBC playing images of old ladies with their belongings on their back in a seemingly hopeless situation created an impetus to act in terms of the morale outrage that such images ensued. 60

78 objective was also convincing the Albanians who comprised 90 percent of the population, not to retaliate for past atrocities as well as instilling faith that the new government would protect them. 179 Additionally, in the American sector, a key PSYOP objective was targeting the youth of Kosovo to stop the cycle of violence and to accept each other as Kosovo citizens. Overall, the key to PSYOP success was repetition, getting the message out on all channels, and avoiding ineffective general themes (lazy PSYOP) for the entire populace. Specializing was the key as well as getting the right message, at the right time, to the right audience. Figure 15. NATO PSYOP composition and accompanying host nation media personnel. 180 Such specializing in terms of dominant target audiences, key communicators, and the youth was and continues to be critical in Kosovo today. In the American sector, CPT David Lloyd, OIC of the Kosovo PSYOP radio and broadcast cell, ran 10 radio and 2 television contracts to broadcast in the MNB-E region that was south of Pristina. All but 1 radio station and 1 television station covered entertainment, news, weather, sports, and a mixture of PSYOP products for the majority Albanian target audience as well as the minority Serb populace Many of the themes revolved around a safe and secure 179 Perception based on the authors daily observation and NATO meetings and assessments during KFOR rotations 3A (2001) and 4A (2002). 180 Peter Beschnidt (LTC, German Army). NATO Psychological Operation brief. (Raleigh, NC: 2004 World Wide PSYOP Conference, 20 November 2004),

79 environment, ethnic tolerance, legitimacy, peaceful coexistence with the Serbian populace as well as preventing revengeful sectarian violence. 181 These included a TV program in Strpce, a radio show in the town between the American base at Camp Bondsteel and Gnjillane, and one in Vitina. A critical lynchpin was our interpreters listening to the programs to ensure that they were promoting messages consistent with our themes. 182 The most successful programs from the American sector were Media day and and remote broadcast. Media day consisted of advertising and selecting the top honors kids from various high schools that consisted of half being Serb and half being Muslim Albanian in a intercultural event. The students would then collaborate together in a magazine called K Teen that was in itself a PSYOP product designed for the younger target audience produced by the brightest kids in MNB-E; the future of Kosovo. The PSYOP product was a win-win because it was produced under supervision by the actual target audience and then distributed nation-wide to their peer age group. 183 Equally effective, remote broadcast consisted of PSYOP personnel, translators, and broadcasters that would go to an actual radio station and would play live music interjected with PSYOP messages of peaceful coexistence and legitimacy as well as hand out items such as: soccer balls, t-shirts, and stationary with PSYOP messages on them. Overall, the radio station owners, town mayors, and local populace welcomed such events as remote broadcast were quite popular and extensively requested in the major towns of Strpce, Gnjillane, and Vitina. 184 So how effective was the amalgam of information operations ranging from magazines, newspapers, radio stations, television, face-to-face, remote broadcast, and the world press had on changing the culture in Kosovo? Overall, the results achieved by the U.S. and NATO media effort was evident in a nationwide survey in October 2000 that showed the international media played a significant role in informing the Serbian people 181 Oral Interview, David Lloyd (CPT, 321 st PSYOP Company, 7 th PSYOP Group, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo). 182 Ibid. 183 Oral Interview, David Lloyd (CPT, 321 st PSYOP Company, 7 th PSYOP Group, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo). 184 Ibid. 62

80 during the crisis. The poll showed that 40 percent of Serbian adults tuned to RFE / RL and the VOA for news during the elections and the beginning of the massive street demonstrations between September 24 and October During this time, more Serbs listened to RFE / RL (37 percent) than Radio Belgrade (31 percent). On 3 October 2000, the day before the demonstrations that overthrew Milosevic, 25 percent of Serbs tuned in to RFE / RL and 20 percent tuned in to the VOA. Additionally, surveys by the Broadcasting Board of Governors also confirmed that international radio was used as a major source of information for the Kosovar refugees that fled to Albania during the conflict. 186 Overall, the impact of the international media that was packaged and delivered in a Balkan tongue that was extremely pivotal in overturning the unfortunate events that had taken place. Again as in previous information and psychological campaigns, it was the use of the host nation media assets, interpreters, journalists, and linguists that were the critical piece that broke the monopoly on the Milosevic state controlled media that had enflamed the populace to a path of genocide. 185 The Institute of Social Sciences, University of Belgrade poll, October Edward Kaufman. A Broadcasting Strategy to Win Media Wars: A Washington Quarterly Reader. The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Using Soft Power to Undermine Terrorist Networks. Edited by Alexander T. J. Lennon. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England. 2003,

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82 IV. OIF / OEF A. INTRODUCTION During the cold war, the U.S. utilized the United States Information Agency, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, military special operations and psychological operations forces, covert propaganda and influence capabilities, and, not least, a Psychological Strategy Board in the White House to high level direction and coordination. 187 The result of all the investment in instruments of soft power painted the Soviet Union as evil and oppressive, while painting the U.S. more favorably. Unfortunately, the perceived lack of threat from a viable power during the post war era led to the dismantling of information apparatuses in the 1990s that had been painstakingly developed during years of fighting the Cold War. The effects of the shut down of agencies that took generations to establish their niche are still being felt today as the U.S. struggles to regenerate such soft power assets. In the war in Iraq, it has appeared that painting the Iraqi government as legitimate, quelling the Ba athist insurgency, as well as defeating Al Qaeda from an informational and a PSYOP perspective has been incredibly difficult to achieve. A number of issues, such as the unpopularity of the war in Iraq, the Iraqi outlook on security, lack of electricity, gas shortages, the incidents at Abu Ghraib, and the perception of detainment facilities as instruments of torture, all have proven to be difficult roadblocks to overcome in the war of ideas. 188 The difficulties are further exacerbated by Iraq and the fact that its neighboring countries already had pre-conceived notions of mistrust, dislike, and misgivings about U.S. foreign policy. Equally challenging was the sectarian divide that plagued Iraq from the onset of the invasion. It has been well versed in the global media, polls, and in political punditry that the U.S. has diminished its popularity throughout the world, with the greatest unpopularity stemming from the Middle East. According to a 2005 Pew study, 17 nations of various geographical locations were polled to determine global attitudes towards the U.S. The 187 Carne Lord. Attacking Terrorism. (Washington DC: Georgetown Press, 2004), Angel Heart Media and Recordings (Host Nation Iraqi Media Outlet). (Baghdad: The Crisis. ) April Angel Heart was a contracted media outlet by the JPOTF in Iraq to poll average Iraqis in Baghdad as to the problems of Iraq. 65

83 poll numbers showed waning numbers since Not surprisingly, approval ratings were abysmally low within Middle Eastern nations and has decreased every year in Iraq since The total accumulation of all the negative aspects of anti-americanism and the outright global rejection of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq has placed psychological operations at a disadvantage from the onset. One cannot but compare the irony behind the juxtaposition of Operation DESERT STORM and OIF: in the first case it was easy to sell the idea of the war as being justifiable cause. This message was relatively easy to convince since the American approval rate of DESERT STORM was 89 percent while the global approval rate was 75% in the early 1990s, compared to approval ratings in the twenties and single digit percentages in the Middle East for OIF. 190 Such waning numbers in terms of the general attitudes towards the United States presents a strategic PSYOP dilemma. Consequently, it places a tremendous burden on operational and tactical PSYOP which depends heavily on the credibility of the United States. At all levels of PSYOP, convincing specific target audiences of an idea is a lot harder if the rest of the world does not believe in what the U.S. is doing, especially in Iraq where the target audiences are privy to BBC and CNN. Anti-Americanism within the Arab world has placed a wall between psychological operations and the Arab target audience. In much of the Arabic media, negative rumors about Americans abound. To provide a few examples, these rumors include the following: American soldiers harvest organs from dying Iraqis; Washington caused the Indian Ocean tsunami in order to kill Muslims; and American soldiers possess special sunglasses that can see through women s clothes. 191 Such negative repetitive sensationalism coupled with the stigma of support for Israel has put a serious drain on winning over the Middle Eastern target audience. When coupled with the fact that the U.S. still has a conventional force of 150,000 military personnel stationed in Iraq, that 189 Pew report, June Ibid. 191 David Kaplan. Amamir Latif. Whitelaw, Kevin, Barnes, Julian E. Hearts, Minds, and Dollars. U.S. News & World Report (Dateline:Pakistan) 25 April

84 these forces have worn out their welcome, and the negative media attention following American missteps (Abu Ghraib and Haditha, for example), the situation becomes even more difficult in the war of ideas.. Despite these strategic inadequacies, there are PSYOP programs that are bringing positive results to Iraq at the nation-wide and lower level. The adoption of the constitution and the democratic processes that resulted in a democratically elected government was a major milestone that was supported by an extensive PSYOP plan from the 4 th POG (Airborne) JPOTF, STRATCOM and the United Nations (through UNAMI, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq), that have been instrumental in changing perceptions. In terms of capturing high value targets (HTVs) PSYOP was at the forefront delivering products in every medium imaginable. A tips hotline run by the U.S. military has led to the arrest of hundreds of key former Ba athists and Al Qaeda and the eventual bombings that finally killed Zarqawi. Such programs were and continue to be highly dependent on host nation media. In regards to OEF, this chapter will examine the utility of the Merlin shortwave broadcast system. A strategic PSYOP shortwave radio program designed to give news, entertainment, and PSYOP messages to the AFGHAN populace. Merlin is unique as it is produced by host nation personnel from Fort Bragg, NC, sent to the British company VT Merlin in London, and then sent via powerful shortwave transmitters to Afghanistan and beyond. 192 B. PSYOP / PHASE I OIF The start of the PSYOP campaign in Iraq started months prior to the March invasion and it consisted of a campaign of leaflet drops, cell phone text messages, s and radio broadcasts that targeted the Iraqi leadership. Over 80 million leaflets were dropped in March of Some leaflets threatened to destroy any military formation that stood and fought, while others encouraged the Iraqi populace and military to ignore the directives of the Baath Party leadership. 193 The Air War College in a debriefing of 192 VT Merlin is a broadcasting company that specializes in global communications. It operates out of London and transmits powerful shortwave signals from the UK, UAE to Afghanistan. Such shortwave broadcast are transmitted across Europe and all throughout Asia; specifically meant for Afghanistan. Broadcasts are in Pashtu and Dari. 193 Steven Collins (LTC, Chief of PSYOP / Operations Division. SHAPE). Mind War (Mons, Belgium) June

85 captured Iraq General Officers estimated that the U.S. Military faced only 15% of possible Iraq firepower due to PSYOP combined with precision bombing. 194 In addition to leaflet operations, the Coalition broadcasted from fixed transmission towers as well as from the flying airborne broadcast platform, the EC-130E aircraft Commando Solo. The Coalition established Information Radio that used a similar format to Radio Sawa with a great deal of popular music interlaced with news and a few announcements. Leaflets were then produced to inform the target audience of the time and frequency of the radio broadcasts. 195 Figure 16. Information Radio Leaflet IZD-001 and IZD-002C. 196 Local PSYOP radio stations were also set up outside of major population centers one being the UK PSYOPS radio station, Radio Nahrain (Two Rivers), an FM radio station established on the outskirts of Basra. In addition to setting up its own radio 194 Michael Ceroli (LTC, P), former commander of the 8 th PSYOP Battalion (A), 4 th PSYOP Group (A). Oral Interview (9 February 2007). 195 Radio Sawa is an Arabic language radio station that was established on 23 March 2002 by the BBG. Its broadcasts are recorded to host nation personnel in Washington D.C., Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Lebonon, Dubai, and the UAE. Funded by the U.S., Sawa provides balanced news and information to a TA of youth mixed with Arabic, Spanish, and English music th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Leaflets IZD-001 and IZD-002D, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 68

86 transmitters, the Coalition electronically jammed Iraqi radio stations, in order to gain a monopoly on the information available to the Iraqi people through this medium. 197 On 20 March 2003, Coalition aircraft and ground units poured into Iraq from Kuwait. Three days later the much famed shock and awe air campaign commenced with Baghdad, Mosul, Basrah, Kirkuk, and Tikrit being rocked with 1,500 bombs and missiles. Within days the Iraqi military was reeling in one defeat after another. The commander of the Republican Guard 51 st Division instantly surrendered with many of the 9,000 soldiers holding 4 th PSYOP Group (A) leaflets in their hands as well as the seizure of 200 tanks. 198 However, the PSYOP results were not fully maximized as most Iraqi soldiers who surrendering were allowed to leave the battlefield and fade back into the populace. Such leaflets like the ones dropped on the 51 st Division and many others were also being monitored by the Iraqi government. Full knowing the power of PSYOP from the previous Gulf War, the Iraqi government established a special psychological collection committee to monitor and track Coalition leaflets. To counter the American PSYOP, the Iraqi government warned its citizens that if they were caught with any PSYOP material, that they would be executed. 199 Additionally, in an attempt to hijack the American PSYOP efforts, the committee distributed leaflets that imitated the American propaganda. 197 Steven Collins (LTC, Chief of PSYOP / Operations Division. SHAPE). Mind War (Mons, Belgium) June th PSYOP Group (A) JPOTF assessment and summary. March April Ibid. 69

87 Figure 17. Enemy Propaganda found by the 10 th Mountain Division. 200 In addition to radio and leaflets, the Coalition also broadcasted television signals via the EC-130 Commando Solo platform. 201 By April 2007, Commando Solo had established a television broadcast to the Iraqi populace called Towards Freedom TV. The messages on Towards Freedom TV depicted Saddam Hussein as a tyrannical leader who had ruined Iraq and made its people suffer. Other broadcasts highlighted the luxurious palaces that Saddam had built throughout Iraq while his people lived in squalor. Still others focused on imploring Iraqi unit commanders and the populace to not destroy the oil fields. An equally important PSYOP theme was the imploring of all civilians to stay in their homes. 202 Despite the effectiveness of such messages, the only limitation to Commando Solo was the few numbers of such platforms, as well as constraints with onstation time, maintenance, and commitments elsewhere. 203 In addition to Commando Solo, the U.S. employed mobile ground PSYOP broadcasting units called SOMS-Bs (Special Operations Media Broadcasting System) once the ground forces began closing in on Baghdad. The advantage of the SOMS-Bs th BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Leaflets IZD-001 and IZD-002D, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 201 The Commando Solo is a C-130 type aircraft that is designed to provide strategic PSYOP via shortwave, FM, AM, television signals (UHF, VHF), as well as the capabilities to interfere and jam frequencies th PSYOP Group (A) JPOTF assessment and summary. March April During my tour in Iraq in a Commando Solo aircraft was diverted for strategic PSYOP operations off the coast of Cuba broadcasting Radio Marti against the Castro regime. 70

88 was their mobility on the battlefield to produce FM, AM, Shortwave, television broadcasts to the Iraqi populace. 204 A total of three units supported Phase I operations. The first unit was in Kuwait as early as December of 2002, a second unit was with the 3 rd Infantry Division as it raced to Baghdad, and the third was placed at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) just 6 miles west of Baghdad. 205 One final platform was added when the USS Tarawa began broadcasting shortwave off the coast of Kuwait. Figure 18. SOMS-B in BIAP May As Coalition forces information systems were being established, PSYOP from Iraq was severely limited due to its information nodes being mostly eliminated. However, as the push for Baghdad was being waged, Iraq conducted ad hoc strategic PSYOP by allowing Al Jazeera to film the dead bodies of captured soldiers from the 507 th Maintenance Company. The intent was to provide a PSYACT against the American 204 The other 3 SOMS-Bs were supporting OEF in Afghanistan. However, by 2005, they were rotating 5. Three in Afghanistan and two in Iraq, and one to Fort Bragg, NC for refitting and repairs. The SOMS-B consisted of two parts: 1. Mobile Radio Broadcast System (MRBS) AM khz KHz FM MHz MHz SW MHz MHz 2. Mobile Television Broadcast System (MTBS) TV MHz, MHz 205 Determining the effectiveness of the SOMS-Bs, Commando Solo, and Sawa have been difficult to assess, especially in Phase I. However, in my interviews with Iraqis who worked in the Green Zone in Baghdad, the majority stated that they listened to the broadcast due to the media void as well as for information concerning the bombing campaign. They also received the frequencies from the millions of radio leaflets that were dropped on Baghdad rd BN Product Development Center (PDC) Files (Unclassified), 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne). Leaflets IZD-001 and IZD-002D, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina). 71

89 public that was similar to the desecrated bodies of Americans in Somalia. 207 Another strategy used by Saddam Hussein was to accentuate the mistakes made by the U.S. in 1991 in leading a revolution in Iraq, only to abandon the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs who Hussein then punished severely. 208 Hussein, knowing that the Iraqi people were critically concerned about the U.S. leaving prematurely, played on this PSYOP theme extensively. 209 He reminded the populace that the U.S. would only go as far as the oil fields and would never get as far north as Baghdad. This was highly believable to the populace who had no reason not to believe Hussein. 210 In countering Saddam s PSYOP, the 3 rd Infantry Division assigned the attached Combat Camera (COM CAM) to take footage of the unit s progress as well as the footage of the Coalition assisting the Iraqi populace with humanitarian aid. The footage would then be uploaded to Commando Solo aircraft and SOMS-Bs, and played throughout Iraq. Such images were difficult to counter by the state run media and many citizens in Baghdad had locally made, black market, satellite dishes, even though owning one meant six months in an Iraqi prison and a life-time of monitoring by Iraqi intelligence. 211 The Iraqi people soon began taking note on the regime s lack of credibility, especially when the denial became comical when Muhammed Saeed al-sahaf ( Baghdad Bob ) repeatedly stated that there were no Americans in the country, despite rapid troop advances. Combat camera effectively showed the Iraqi people that the regime was lying to them by showing American units alongside known landmarks within Iraqi cities. The most discreditable images for the Ba athist regime were the undeniable evidence of th PSYOP Group (A) JPOTF assessment and summary. March April rd U.S. Infantry Division (Mechanized). 3 rd Infantry Division After Action Review (AAR) (Fort Drum, New York: February 2004), 269. The 3 rd Infantry Division was the tip of the spear in the push to Baghdad. Other units were the 101 st Airborne, 82 nd Airborne, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Unit. 209 Even upon the capture of Saddam Hussein, many Iraqis that I talked to still feared that somehow some way, when the Americans left, that Saddam or members of the Ba athist party would take over Iraq and punish those who consorted with the Americans. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid.,

90 columns of American units entering Baghdad. 212 Below are the themes and messages from SOMS-B, Commando Solo, and the USS Tarawa that were conducted in May Figure 19. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Kuwait rd U.S. Infantry Division (Mechanized). 3 rd Infantry Division After Action Review (AAR) (Fort Drum, New York: February 2004), th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: ). 73

91 Figure 20. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from BIAP th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: ). 74

92 Figure 21. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages from Commando Solo th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: ). 75

93 Figure 22. SOMS-B Coverage and Messages From the USS Tarawa. 216 Although gauging direct indicators of MOE are challenging in a combat environment, there were several positive indicators that showed successes in conjunction with the Coalition PSYOP themes. For one, there were enormous surrenders from the regular army units, including the elite Republican Guard. When encountered by Coalition units, these Iraqi soldiers were doing exactly what the PSYOP leaflets had instructed them to do, and they were also frequently holding the leaflets themselves when they were discovered by American forces. Secondly, there were very few Iraqis who were internally displaced during the major combat operations, following the PSYOP campaign the Iraqis had been instructed to stay in their homes due to the precision bombing th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: ). 76

94 campaign. Third, the Coalition managed to convince the Iraqi civilian and military target audiences that preserving the oil fields would only benefit them in the future. 217 C. PSYOP / DURING OCCUPATION IN OIF Once the Coalition began to establish itself in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority came into effect as the proxy government whose aims were to immediately begin the process of establishing a democratically elected self ruling government in Iraq. To do this, a part of the overall plan to legitimize Iraq was to foster the growth of the media in Iraq. 218 The four goals of the CPA included: 1. Foster a professional Iraqi media industry which operates under the conventions of unbiased reporting and freedom of speech. 2. Establish regional governorate strategic communications support teams to coordinate and facilitate campaigns. 3. Establish regulations and licensing requirements for Iraqi media companies. 4. Foster development of independent media companies to include production, market research, advertising, publishing and broadcasting companies. 219 From the four provisions, arose the Iraqi Media Network (IMN). IMN was established to provide the needed jumpstart to satellite television, radio, and newspaper industries that would be at the heart of establishing credible media network in Iraq. 220 At the same time, MNF-I established strategic communications (STRATCOM) as the coalition s arm in conducting information operations at all levels within Iraq. Under STRATCOM, there were the subordinate organizations of the Joint Psychological 217 JPOTP. Brief on current Operations in support of OIF (Baghdad, Iraq: May 2003). 218 To this day, one cannot talk about the CPA without talking about the egregious errors that it made during its initial establishment. One was the disbanding of the Iraqi military into the public sector that proved to be disastrous mistake that is being paid for today. This decision de-legitimized the CPA as well as discredited them in the eyes of the Iraqi military that was waiting for them to be included in the plan to re-shape Iraq. This decision continues to have a negative effect to this day, as well as a having a negative impact on PSYOP at all levels. 219 CPA. Strategic Plan. Strategic Communications assessment (Baghdad, Iraq 25 June 2004). 220 Ibid. 77

95 Operations Task Force (JPOTF) headed by 8 th Battalion / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne), Civil Affairs, Public Affairs (PAO), and Information Operations (IO). 221 Additionally, civilian companies like Balloch & Roe were active in providing liaison support between military units and Iraqi media. 222 Once the occupation phase of Iraq was commenced, the JPOTF begin establishing contracts with the local media. The JPOTF was given the means by MNF-I to fund the infusion of PSYOP in the various media throughout Iraq. This allowed the Coalition and the Iraqi government to benefit from white truthful PSYOP that would foster the legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi government, legitimacy of the upstart Iraqi National Army and the Iraqi Security police, discrediting the former Ba athist regime, and the tracking down of wanted insurgents and Al Qaeda fighters. The media organizations that the JPOTF came in contact with consisted of former Ba athist news outlets that were either Sunni, Shia, or Kurdish in slant. There were also formerly expelled news media such as Azzaman newspaper that had been run in London by expelled or fleeing Iraqis as well as the new IMN backed media, all of which were funded by the CPA. 223 In a matter of months, news outlets in all forms began to sprout in Iraq. As each month progressed, the expanse of media in Iraq could be made evident in the explosion of satellite dishes that were being put up around the country. 224 As a consequence in a growing media infrastructure, there are a myriad of media outlets that can be used in addition to Iraqi merchandise companies that have been and will continue to be an important part of the Coalition information campaign. One of the fastest growing industries in Iraq has been the swell of satellite, radio, and newspaper media outlets in Iraq that are quite novel to the country due to years of the state controlled the media. During the time of the Hussein regime, there were no independent satellite television, radio stations, or newspapers allowed. When the regime fell, a media th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: ). 222 Such coordination entailed receiving PSYOP products from the JPOTF and PSYOP staff and infusing them in the host nation media platforms th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: ). 224 Similar to my experience in Kosovo, as soon as the Ba athists regime was removed, my operations entailed driving throughout Iraq under cover to monitor and coordinate with the media for the JPOTF. As each week and month passed, there were was a noticeable difference in the amount of satellite dishes that were being placed in residential homes. 78

96 void was filled by newspapers, radio stations, and satellite television stations that would run the gamut of ideology from pro-coalition, neutral, to anti-coalition. 225 Such a swell in media growth was also helped by a moderate portion of the Iraqi populace that could read and write English. During the 1970s, Saddam Hussein implemented English in schools due to the connection with oil and commerce. As a result, the Iraqi populace today, has a moderate proportion of English speaking citizens, which aids in Coalition PSYOP efforts. By having a pool of translators, journalists, and broadcasters, the hired host media personnel could not only produce products in Arabic, but also produce them in English as well. This was especially convenient since most PSYOP products are approved at the flag officer level. 226 Additionally, knowing English also meant knowing about the American culture as it bridged the gap and led to worker relationships that were ideal. In fact, many Iraqis became so proficient and trusted, that they became quite knowledgeable of PSYOP and their opinions weighed heavily when it came to developing products. 227 It was also not surprising that some radio stations chose on their own to broadcast in English. In fact, the radio station atop the tallest building in Iraq, the Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, is an English speaking radio station that is used extensively by the Coalition due to its secure location. The station called IQ4, on the frequency, reaches out to a young Iraqi target audience with popular western music that is mixed with PSYOP messages. Throughout the day and evening, the JPOTF would monitor the station and soon the PSYOP personnel began to notice a trend of Iraqi youth calling the station in English and 225 Baghdad Mosquito. Observations from daily reports (Baghdad, Iraq ). Baghdad mosquito is an organization that works directly for the embassy in Iraq. Its task is to track or report on all media in Iraq as well as their slant and talking points. They also conduct polling data as well as operate throughout Iraq to assess rumors, attitudes, and morale of the populace th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: ). From 2004 to the current date, insurgent and Al Qaeda have targeted such workers of the coalition. Zarqawi targeted such personnel that worked for the coalition. He would then execute them and make video DVDs to threaten the populace. I felt this intimidation has not worked since most Iraqis are desperate for work. Despite the bombings and kidnappings, there are still long lines for a variety of jobs throughout Iraq th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: ). 79

97 requesting songs (usually rap and R&B). 228 At IQ4, the Coalition found a radio that was secure and that was able to play PSYOP radio injects 229 of themes related to legitimacy of the Iraqi government, the terrorist tips hotline, as well as establishing unity in Iraq. 230 The second radio dissemination asset was the National Media Dissemination Platform. Instead of just one radio station, the National Media Dissemination Platform would receive PSYOP radio injects from the JPOTF and then distribute them to five radio stations throughout Iraq. Since the messages were going to a broad audience, the content had to be broad as well. As the case, PSYOP injects concentrated on the broad operational themes of capturing Al Qaeda terrorists, legitimacy of the Iraqi government, voting, and the repetitive message of Iraqi unity. The radio stations were: KHAK FM in Sulaymaniya, Kurdistan FM Radio-Dahuk, Baghdad FM, Baghdad AM, and Basrah FM. The success of the radio stations were evident, as they were a few attempted attacks that luckily failed. Additionally, the paid translators that worked at the JPOTF were given the task to monitor the radio stations to ensure that they were playing the right messages or any messages at all. Consequently, receiving payment was predicated on the precise injects being placed. 231 An example of a PSYOP product played would be the The Crisis. The Crisis was made by an Iraqi production company called Ocean Heart. The POTF would give them a theme and they would do a show, interview guest, and discuss the latest issues that were pressing Iraq. After the one hour radio broadcasts was approved by the JPOTF 228 The Iraqi station manager from IQ4 stated that the youth would call to the station and speak English as a form of rebellion and self expression. It is also noteworthy that IQ4 is positioned atop the tallest building in Iraq; the Baghdad Sheraton Ishtar Hotel, thus giving a propagation advantage. 229 Injects are PSYOP broadcasts that are technically formatted to the mediums of radio, television or internet. 230 IQ4 was my most reliable dissemination source for radio because of the relationship that our team developed with the station manager. The station was owned by Balloch & Roe and was controlled by Ghassan Ridah, a self starting Iraqi who was the most trusted agent that the JPOTF employed. Unfortunately, he was kidnapped in December 2006 and his whereabouts are still unknown. 231 Initially I had problems with the NDMP because I felt that they were not playing the correct injects that I instructed them to play. I solved the problem by asking the tactical PSYOP teams in the area to verify with their translators, as well as using our own translators and Arab speaking soldiers to listen in to the stations in Baghdad. Additionally, I tasked the NDMP, to bring in recorded transcripts of the messages played. 80

98 and the assigned translators, the injects would then be given to IQ4 and the National Media Dissemination Platform. An example of a show that was translated by the POTF is as follows: 1. The Crisis starts the program with the following lines. The crisis winds storm us, from the electricity Crisis to Benzene (gasoline) and the Kerosene or natural gas is not the last one. The drastic one is about the terrorists. 2. The program continues with the overall theme; the reason for the electricity, kerosene, and natural gas crisis is due to the terrorists. The program then links the acts of the terrorists with the long lines at the gas stations, the ever increasing gas prices at the fuel pumps. Additionally, Iraqi citizens who depend on gasoline such as taxi drivers pay up to 10 to 15 times the regular price in the black market. Overall the first portion links the terrorists to the answer of the ironic question of a land so rich in oil but yet so deficient in the common fuels for the average Iraqi consumer. The show then transitions into the specifics of the electricity crisis. It states that Iraqi endure only 2 hrs of electricity a day. During the 2 hrs, the electricity often goes down on an average of 5-6 times. For the electricity, it is the acts of the terrorists who destroy the power plants and kidnap the foreign workers that repair and work on the oil and power facilities. Overall for this segment, it blames the terrorists for the acts that destroy the infrastructure. It also depicts the terrorists as them not wanting a viable infrastructure for Iraq, as they link it with the success of the coalition and the much hated new democracy of Iraq. The tail end of the program wraps the entire issue of the attacks on the infrastructure on the issue of security. It implores Iraqis to stand up and fight the terrorists, support the police, Iraqi National Guard (ING), and the Iraqi army; as they cannot do it alone. The program ends with the call to dispose and rid the terrorist from Iraq. It is the terrorist that wishes to turn Iraq into a dark epoch. The program then ends with Iraqi National Anthem. 232 Overall, the success of playing PSYOP products paid off in dividends, especially with the tips hotline for wanted insurgents that would be played on our broadcasts. The tips hotline would feature messages about the top 5 wanted insurgents in Iraq in a given week. MOE amounted to receiving hundreds of phone calls from both inside and outside of Iraq on the whereabouts of insurgents. If a given tip amounted to a capture, the source would be financially rewarded. Additionally, the two SOMS-Bs that were west of Baghdad, played the same mirror programs as in IQ4 and the National Media 232 Ocean Heart Productions, Baghdad, Iraq. The Crisis. April

99 Dissemination Platform. 233 The combination of military and civilian radio stations gave the total number of 8 radio stations playing in Iraq. Clearly, two military radio stations (SOMS-Bs) could have not covered the necessary area to reach the entire Iraqi audience. Host nation media was essential in filling the gaps. The two figures below show the propagation of the SOMS-Bs and the host nation radio stations. The first figure shows just the SOMS-Bs and it is quite evident that just using military radio stations would have not covered Iraq. The second figure shows the SOMS-Bs with the augmented host nation media that provides a much better coverage of the radio target audience within Iraq. 234 From the comparison, it is clearly evident that the host nation media assets are a critical part of the information campaign in Iraq th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 234 Ibid. 235 Ibid. 82

100 Figure 23. SOMS-B Coverage in Iraq th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). Note that the SOMS-B package is quite limited in coverage. Additionally, it could only broadcast in one mode; either AM or FM in this case. 83

101 Figure 24. SOMS-B and Host Nation Media Coverage in Iraq. 237 The second arm of PSYOP dissemination was the use of the host nation newspapers. Like the radio stations, the JPOTF was absolutely incapable of replicating these various forms of media that were widely consumed by the target audiences. Even if they could, the Iraqis would still prefer the Iraqi media over a media to known to be foreign. 238 The newspapers worked the same way as the radio injects as they were given to the Balloch & Roe corporation for distribution to the local media. Balloch & Roe distributed PSYOP products to three local newspapers: Azzaman, Al Taakhi, and Al th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). Notice the coverage when limited military assets were augmented with host nation media. It is of note that the propagation estimate was affected by terrain both mountainous and urban. As such the circles would differ due to those affects. Currently, there is a plan to extend the coverage of broadcast to all the cities along the Tigris / Euphrates belt as well as key towns in the Al Anbar province. 238 Ibid. 84

102 Yoom. 239 Additionally, PSYOP inserts were also given to the National Media Dissimination Platform which had access to eight newspapers. The following are the newspapers, locations, slant, and circulation: Kbit-Irbil-(Kurdish)-20,000 Hawlati- Sulaymaniyah (Weekly newspaper)-(kurdish) / 10,000 New Kurdistan- Sulaymaniya- (Kurdish) / 20,000 Al Hadbaa- Mosul (Only a weekly newspaper)-(kurdish) / 4,000 Al Sabah-Baghdad-(IMN controlled no known bias) 30,000 Al Mada-Baghdad-(Communist) / 5,000 Al Manarah-Basrah- (No known bias / Printed in Kuwait) / 10,000 Al Nadah-Basrah- (Sunni) / 5,000 Iraq Al Yoom- (Pro Coalition / Shia Ownner) / 10,000 Al Taakhi- (Pro Coalition / Kurdish Newspaper / 17,000 Azzaman Newspaper- (No known bias) / 50, The listed newspapers would receive a weeks worth of PSYOP products and then print them in their daily newspapers. Overall, the print media reinforced and focused attention on the visual (electronic) PSYOP. A typical PSYOP product in the Azzaman Newspaper would feature an opinion piece written by the JPOTF s Iraqi journalist / translators, supported by a cartoon that usually targeted insurgents and Zarqawi. 241 Additionally, the tips line would also be placed in the newspapers that included visual 239 Balloch & Roe were instrumental in ensuring PSYOP messages were playing correctly at each media outlet. Balloch & Roe hired Iraqi contractors and journalists that were absolutely superb. They provided feedback on broadcasts and print issues, picked up the daily injects and print products from the JPOTF, and networked extensively throughout all the media networks in Iraq. It was their networking prowess that allowed the JPOTF to establish a viable satellite television contract. 240 Data provided to the author by Balloch and Roe during my assignment in Iraq. Albeit by good intentions, Information Operations in Iraq established an enormous contract with an inexperienced company named Lincoln Group, that was in excess of over 100 million dollars to establish PSYOP contacts. Besides the Lincoln Group products being ineffective, the JPOTF had already established contracts with newspapers in every major urban center of Iraq. The Lincoln Group would then pay the exact same media outlets that the JPOTF had established. This led to confusion as to who had contracts with the established media as well as establishing a dysfunctional precedence with the Iraqi media as well. 241 Ibid. 85

103 recognition, points of contact, and a reward if the information led to the capture. Below are two examples of cartoons that would be placed alongside an OP / ED narrative in the various newspapers: Figure 25. (Zarqawi Campaign 2005) 242 Figure 26. (ISF and Iraqis Voting in 2005) th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 243 Ibid. 86

104 Figure 27. (Rewards for Tips Program 2005). 244 To supplement PSYOP via radio and newspapers, the JPOTF along with a variety of units in Iraq used billboards to communicate with the populace. The billboard messages were designed to foster support from the Iraqi populace for the national army, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the Iraqi government. Usually the billboards would stay up for three to six months and would be immediately replaced if they were damaged by weather or vandalism. In terms of the JPOTF s experience with billboards, the most popular were the ones that showed ISF or Iraqi armies as a powerful force. Additionally, billboards were also used to drive home the message about Iraqis protecting their kids from terrorists by informing the authorities of their whereabouts or activities. The billboards were used in conjunction with all the forms of media that were intended to provide a repetitive PSYOP message while Iraqis were on the road. Below is an example of a billboard that was placed along Route Irish, regarded as the most dangerous road in Iraq th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 245 Ibid. 87

105 Figure 28. (Anti-terrorist billboard along Route Irish near BIAP). 246 To augment the visual print media of newspapers, the JPOTF produced with the help of Iraqi journalists, translators, and artists, the Shanasheel Magazine (later renamed Yenebia) and the Thunder Team Comic Book. Shanasheel magazine, Iraq s first national magazine, was a cultural magazine that featured interviews with key Iraqi figures in government, as well as stories on infrastructure improvement such as schools, oil fields, and commerce. The magazine was produced monthly with 50,000 copies that were printed and disseminated throughout Iraq. The success of the Shanasheel magazine was negligible due to staffing and production issues that were later remedied by hiring an entire new crew to develop, print, and disseminate the magazine. Once that occurred, the magazine became quite popular due to the content and the shiny paged appearance that the magazine featured th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005).An Iraqi billboard company named Ninevah Billboards were contracted by the JPOTF to emplace billboards. Unfortunately, the contract work was abruptly ended after Ninevah billboards was destroyed by an Iraqi car bomb. 247 Ibid. The JPOTF discovered that a magazine with attractive shiny paper of good quality was very popular among the Iraqi populace. Based on the culture, magazines and newspapers were passed between friends and family members. Therefore, one print product can have the potential of 10 to 50 viewers. 88

106 Figure 29. (Shanasheel Magazine in Baghdad) 248 Figure 30. (Shanasheel Magazine in Mosul). 249 Once Shanasheel Magazine was established, the JPOTF decided to go for a target audience that was younger by developing the Thunder Team Comic Book. Thanks to a great staff both U.S. and Iraqi, a quality paper source, and a reliable print contract, the Thunder Team Comic was an instant hit. This was evident from the Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPTs) requesting more be made due to the instant following that the comic book created. 250 The overall theme of the comic book involved the Thunder Team elite unit from the Iraqi Police (IP) and the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) that would fight and defeat th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 249 Ibid. 250 Ibid. 89

107 the evil terrorists in Iraq; a good guy- bad guy story. The plots always involved a terrorists trying to kill or harm innocent civilians only to be thwarted by the ever vigilant and powerful Thunder Team. In addition to the popularity with the youth of Iraq, the comic book became very popular among the Iraqi Security Forces who loved seeing themselves in a superhero role. The result was the JPOTF benefiting from having multiple target audiences respond to the comic book that enforced the themes of legitimacy of the Iraqi government as well as capturing or killing the insurgents and terrorist. 251 Figure 31. (The Thunder Team Comic Book) th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 252 Ibid. 90

108 Figure 32. ( Tracking the Terrorist ). 253 The final PSYOP piece that the JPOTF added in 2005 was the use of satellite television. By 2005, other than a few public service announcements, there were no long term contracted agreements with the satellite network affiliates for broadcast of PSYOP products. This was a troubling fact since by 2005, Iraqis received most of their news and entertainment via satellite television. 254 The two dominant satellite stations were Al Iraqiya and Al Sharkia; the two stations that evolved as major networks due to their initial funding in 2003 from the IMN and the CPA. For the JPOTF, the priority was contracting Al Iraqiya, because it was the most watched satellite channel for both news and entertainment: a STRATCOM poll had found that Al Iraqi held 50 percent of the viewers, while Al Sharkia captured only 30 percent. 255 Surprisingly, Al Jazeera and terrestrial television ranked at 10 percent equally. 256 This th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 254 STRATCOM, Media Poll in Baghdad and surrounding cities (Baghdad: April 2005). 255 Ibid. 256 Ibid. 91

109 showed what the JPOTF had believed: that Iraqis wanted their news and entertainment from fellow Iraqis and not from a foreign source. However, it was also assumed that in the hotbed areas of anti-coalition sentiment, Al Arabia, Al Jazeera and Al Sawa received much higher viewership. There were other satellite stations that received negligible viewership such as Rotana, a satellite station owned by Rotana Hotels, a company out of Dubai. Another was MBC, a Saudi -owned company broadcasting a mix of free-to-air news and entertainment channels via satellite from its headquarters at the Dubai Media City in the United Arab Emirates. 257 By May of 2005, the JPOTF established a contract with Al Iraqia that was greatly assisted by Balloch & Roe as an intermediate agent. 258 Once the contract was firmly established, the JPOTF decided to include PSYOP products that would air during prime time hours ( hrs) on the Al Iraqiya satellite network. 259 The use of Al Iraqiya provided the JPOTF an incredibly prolific platform for the dissemination of PSYOP. The use of the expensive media platform was used almost extensively for countering Al Qaeda and the insurgency. Breaking into the satellite TV market was a huge step, and one that was long over do, as the JPOTF was only utilizing PSYOP inserts in newspapers, magazines, comic books, and radio stations. Since most Iraqis watched satellite TV for both news and entertainment, PSYOP began to have a greater effect due to the fact it was now reaching an Iraqi wide audience. With hundreds of hours of video tape on hand that showed the destruction at the hands of insurgents, torture during the Saddam Hussein regime, and footage detailing the legitimacy of the Iraqi government, it was all too easy to incorporate the videos towards 257 STRATCOM Assessments Division, Baghdad. (MNF-I Assessment Poll). April 2005). 258 Ghassan Ridah, an Iraqi national single handedly established the contract with Al Iraqia due to his connections with the media outlets and IMN. Ghassan was the JPOTF s go to person when it came to coordinating for PSYOP throughout the country until he was abducted in December It was the contracting process at MNF-I at Camp Victory that was the most frustrating portion of the process. The contract had to be briefed to the STRATCOM commander, an Air Force Brigadier General. Afterwards, we had to establish a series of justification paperwork and then go before a Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB). 259 After the JARB approved the contract, the funding then had to be approved via the combined land forces command in Kuwait. After finally being approved, the JPOTF then had to transfer the documents from MNF-I to the Baghdad contracting office. Once there, the contract was prepared and finally signed by Al Iraqia. This process took an eternity compared to Zarqawi who could easily take advantage of satellite television in a day s time. The JPOTF had to wait 3 months! 92

110 the PSYOP satellite TV campaign. 260 During the onset of the Al Iraqiya contract which began in May 2005, the JPOTF began to experiment with graphic scenes that included women and children laying in the streets in the aftermath of insurgency terrorist explosions as well as referencing the Al Maeda verses of the Koran. The results created a wave of anger at the insurgency and helped to further demonize Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. 261 In one notable video, Zarqawi s famous human shields speech stated it was okay to kill the human shields regardless of being Muslim. The video included his speech behind a backdrop of horrific explosions and actual footage of body parts. The video set quite a ripple through Iraqi viewers as they were not accustomed to such PSYOP from the Coalition. A good measure of effectiveness was the amount of phone calls from angry citizens to the satellite TV stations expressing their anger with terrorism, especially Zarqawi. 262 To make the PSYOP videos even more effective, they were placed during commercial time in the highest rated show in Iraq, Terror in the Hands of Justice. 263 Terror in the Hands of Justice, was a reality show that aired the grieving families of the victims while calling for justice against the terrorist responsible for their love ones death, while also airing actual terrorist who confess and repent for their actions. The PSYOP campaign was different than the traditional antiseptic peace dove or children playing while depicting the future of Iraq. The more Zarqawi bombed citizens, the more the JPOTF demonized him through every form of media available, over-and-over again to the Iraqi populace. Finally in October of 2005, Ayman al-zawahri, Al Qaeda s number 2 leader, wrote a letter that questioned Zarqawi s methods that involved killing thousands of 260 There is no doubt that the Iraqi people have no faith in the current government due to the inability to provide security. However, what the Al Iraqia contract established for the JPOTF, was a platform that was technically at par with the global media, as well as the ability to reach the Iraqi government. The graphic details from insurgency and Al Qaeda suicide attacks created considerable hatred towards those elements by the Iraqi people. JPOTF PSYOP programs capitalized on this and strove to create an even bigger wedge between the populace and the insurgency. However, a critical setback for PSYOP is the general attitude amongst Iraqis that their government and the presence of the Coalition are ineffective in stopping the violence in the country th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 262 Ghassan, Ridah, Balloch & Roe. Assessment from Al Iraqia Television (Baghdad: May 2005). 263 Al Iraqiya. Terror in the Hands of Justice. (Mosul, Iraq: May, 2005). 93

111 Muslims. Zawahiri devoted significant attention to al-zarqawi's attempts to start a civil war with the rival Muslim Shiite sect, the majority that now dominates the new Iraqi government. Ultimately, al-zawahri concluded that violence, particularly against Shiite mosques, only raises questions among Muslims. 264 He also pointed out that "more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media we are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our umma," or community of Muslims. 265 In short, Zawahiri s complaints about Zarqawi s methods - were directly in line with the themes and objectives of the Zarqawi PSYOP campaign that the JPOTF was conducting. In addition to the tips hotline and the Zarqawi broadcasts, there were other videos that highlighted the positives in Iraq. For instance, the JPOTF began airing videos that featured the construction projects that the military and civilian engineers had built. By May 2005, the 1,000 th project was built in Iraq with little fanfare. Besides the local populace, most Iraqis had no knowledge of the projects being built for Iraq. As a result, the JPOTF developed video commemorating the 1,000 th project and featured a video per week on the status of construction operations within Iraq. The construction videos were considered a success as it exposed to the Iraqis that progress was being made. The videos were especially important during times when Iraqis were upset at shortages in electricity and gasoline. 266 In terms of the JPOTF disseminating video products, it had for the first time, a platform that could reach the entire Iraqi audience via the most watched form of media throughout the country. Below are the locations and stations that satellite TV was aired throughout Iraq Ayman Zawahiri. 12 October Letter to Zarqawi (Baghdad: 12 October 2005). 265 Ibid th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 267 Al Iraqiya. Terror in the Hands of Justice

112 Table 1. Locations of Satellite TV coverage. 268 $151,200 / $1,814,400 / $.84 PER SECOND IN PRIME TIME HOURS. LOCATION CHANNEL DURATION LOCATION CHANNEL DURATION Baghdad 7 1 Min. Karbala 5 1 Min. Baghdad 9 1 Min. Karbala 6 1 Min. Baghdad 37 1 Min. Maysan 11 1 Min. Mosul 7 1 Min. Basrah 11 1 Min. Mosul 9 1 Min. Al Garbi 9 1 Min. Kirkuk 6 1 Min. Dewenia 12 1 Min. Baquba 22 1 Min. Tikrit 6 1 Min. Al Qaim 7 1 Min. Suq Shiokh 26 1 Min. Kut 9 1 Min. Ramadi 5 1 Min. Haditha 6 1 Min. Najaf 5 1 Min. Al Nasir 9 1 Min. The addition of the Al Iraqia satellite contract added 21 Iraqi satellite channels that the JPOTF could now disseminate products throughout Iraq. This was critical in diversifying the JPOTF s PSYOP capability in reaching the entire populace of Iraq. All together, this allowed the JPOTF to now disseminate products via satellite TV, radio, terrestrial TV, newspapers, internet, magazines, comic books, posters, handbills, as well as a variety of imaginative items such as soccer balls, stickers, match books, and stationary. Essentially, a good PSYOP program should have a saturation effect that involves a variety of media sources; the addition of satellite television added that dimension. An example below is the Zarqawi program. Just as MNF-I dedicated a considerable amount of resources in trying to capture or kill Zarqawi, the JPOTF followed suit by dedicating an entire PSYOP campaign to this individual who was creating so much destruction in Iraq. This campaign was executed by utilizing every form of media available to the JPOTF. Although Zarqawi s foolish tactics of destroying Shia mosques and beheadings 268 Al Iraqiya. Terror in the Hands of Justice

113 demonized him on his own merits, PSYOP was able to capitalize by repetitively attacking him on all fronts while creating an even bigger wedge with him and the populace. 269 Figure 33. (Zarqawi Campaign ). 270 However, despite the eventual killing of Zarqawi, the ongoing PSYOP campaign now has to contend with the legacy he left Iraq with: the sudden rise in sectarian violence that has claimed thousands of Iraqi lives. The challenge of controlling Iraq s surge of violence has left Iraqis with a bitter taste in their mouths concerning the U.S. presence there. This has made the PSYOP mission in Iraq extremely challenging to pull off. The recent Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) published some alarming figures about the confidence in the Coalition and the new government to stabilize Iraq. Recent polls suggest an information and PSYOP crisis within Iraq. Only 36 percent of Iraqis feel their country is headed in the right direction, and 79 percent have a mostly negative view of the influence the U.S. has had on their country. Even more alarming, is that 61 percent th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 270 Ibid. 96

114 approve of attacks on U.S. forces. 271 This is coupled with an unfavorable opinion throughout the world and a growing unfavorable opinion in the United States populace as well as its lawmakers. The result is a growing trend that parallels the findings in Chapter 3 with how PSYOP was affected in Vietnam. Essentially, the challenges of the combat situation on the ground have created a discrediting effect upon most of the PSYOP effort because the target audience sees the reality on the ground. The Iraqis have become frustrated at a U.S. force that fails to stop the daily car bombings that are killing so many Iraqis. Getting the Iraqis to believe that the sky is blue when all they see is red is a good analogy to the campaign there. However, the one ace in hole for PSYOP has been the populace s disdain for Al Qaeda due to all the carnage they have caused. This continues to be an angle that PSYOP will exploit for months to come with considerable success. 272 Throughout OIF, the U.S. has shown an incredible resiliency by sticking with the commitment of not leaving Iraq like it did in Vietnam. The U.S. has now committed to altering its ground strategy while intensifying its efforts to train-up the Iraqi military and police force. Fortunately, for the U.S., most Americans feel that pulling out of Iraq would be a mistake; the national will to continue the fight is obviously much different than in Vietnam. With the new strategy implemented, hopefully Baghdad will be wrestled away from the clutches of the insurgents, the hope of stability and an increase confidence in the populace will make the job of reaching the hearts and minds that much easier there. Then you have to do the same with rest of Iraq while slowly squeezing the insurgency. There is no doubt that PSYOP along with other elements of Special Operations in Iraq will be needed for years to come. Just as the U.S. were conducting PSYOP missions in Iraq long before OIF, so too will the need to conduct PSYOP in Iraq long after most U.S. forces have redeployed and the mission in Iraq becomes advisory in nature. That message will continue to be a slow and methodical process of products, series, and campaigns whose results may not take effect in months or even years from now; even so, the results will be difficult to gauge as history has shown. However, what has been 271 Iraqi Study Group. The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington D.C.: December 2006) th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (Baghdad, Iraq: 2005). 97

115 clearly evident is the fact that Iraqis respond better to the PSYOP message when it is coming from their fellow Iraqis via the Iraqi media. 273 D. PSYOP / THE MERLIN INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF OEF By 2004, the Combined Forces Campaign-Afghanistan (CFC-A), were distributing PSYOP products to over 54 radio stations throughout Afghanistan in addition to two SOMS-Bs. Overall, the PSYOP broadcasts were effective in keeping the populace informed, distributing information of wanted Taliban and Al Qaeda, and delivering news and entertainment via the dominant form of broadcast in Afghanistan; shortwave radio. However, with 54 stations spread all throughout Afghanistan, it was difficult to gauge whether the radio stations were up to date in playing the correct PSYOP injects, or even playing them at all. Additionally, the radio stations were quite weak in strength and had only a km range. 274 Traveling through Afghanistan was quite difficult due to the mountainous terrain, poor roads, and pockets of Taliban resistance. What was needed was a nationwide propagation medium that could blanket the entire country with shortwave radio. The answer was VT Merlin out of London, England. VT Merlin was and continues to be a leading provider of critical communications services to customers in the space communications, broadcast, defense, and security market sectors. VT Merlin had the extensive experience that CFC-A desired as well as powerful transmitters that could not only reach Afghanistan, but could also provide a strong signal against Chinese jamming or attempts to overpower the frequencies in Afghanistan. 275 Once the contract with VT Merlin was established, broadcasts to Afghanistan soon followed with the first signal being transmitted in September of What made the Merlin program unique was that it was a radio station whose programming was produced in Fort Bragg, NC, by Afghan natives who were hired as journalists, broadcasters, and translators. Together with the PSYOP personnel, the group recorded th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: 2005). 274 Ibid. 275 VT Merlin. Operational Summary Brief (London, England: October 2004). VT Merlin had extensive contracts with the European Space Agency (ESA), BBC World Service, UK Ministry of Defense (MOD), and the U.S. DoD. VT Merlin delivers 1,000 hours of broadcasting per day. 98

116 12.5 hours of news, entertainment, weather, sports, music, as well as scheduled PSYOP messages each hour. By December of 2004, the group had reached a tempo of creating 18 hours of recordings for each day, and the 3 rd and 8 th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) worked around the clock to produce a fresh new 18 hour program for each day. Once an 18 hour disk was made, it was immediately transferred to VT Merlin via a File Transfer Protocol connection (FTP). Once received, the engineers at VT Merlin would double check the disk and then blast the broadcast via shortwave from England at their station sites in the United Arab Emirates. The result was a powerful shortwave signal that blanketed Afghanistan. 276 The program was an instant success with a powerful signal that reached by 95 percent of the entire Afghan populace. To track the propagation, VT Merlin engineers were positioned in Pakistan and Uzbekistan, supplemented by ground tactical PSYOP teams (TPTs) that monitored the station while conducting their missions. Below is one such signal report that was conducted by the TPTs th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: October 2004). Propagation in Afghanistan was quite strong with the VT Merlin signal. However, due to the mountainous terrain, their were signals in some areas that were weak, moderate, and strong. Overall, the signal was carried consistently throughout Afghanistan. 99

117 MERLIN Signal tests As of 18 Nov 04 TEST # 1113a Mazar-e Kond TEST # 1113 IVO Bagram AB Fair signal Her TEST # 1117a IVO Chagcharan Poor signal TEST # 1023 Bamia IVO Day Kundi Good signal Baghla IVO Kabul Good signal Kabu Bagra Asadab Jalalab Peshaw Islamaba IVO Herat Shinda Good Signal TEST # 1117 Zara Baghr Geres Deh Gheck Tarin Qandah Spin Gard Qal Jacobab Orgun Lwar Shki Parachin Koh Khow Miramsh Wan IVO Islamabad Fair signal TEST # 1022 Frequencies 0200z-0500z kHz 0700z-1200z kHz 1200z-1300z khz 1300z-1500z kHz 1500z-1630z kHz Quett VT Merlin test POTF test Figure 34. (Merlin Signal Reception). 277 A critical piece to our operations was getting the target audience to tune with the broadcasts. This was conducted months before the first broadcast took place by announcing the oncoming arrival of the new broadcast. The populace of Afghanistan was informed via leaflets, posters, The Peace Newspaper, as well utilizing various radio stations to broadcast the arrival date and most importantly, the frequencies on which the Merlin broadcast would play. 278 As hoped, the Merlin initiative proved to be a big success. It easily gained nationwide recognition and soon started to compete with BBC broadcasts throughout Afghanistan. The big picture was the 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) had produced a product that was made in North Carolina and then broadcasted to the other side of the world to cover all of Afghanistan. It is and continues to be a strategic PSYOP tool that is th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: 18 November 2004). 278 Ibid. 100

118 helping shape Afghanistan as well as a perfect example of how 6 Afghan host nation media personnel can reach and capture an entire Afghan listening audience. 279 Below are examples of scripts and an average 1 hour radio wheel produced at Fort Bragg. Product # Topic Length (d,p) 1251 Coalition is strong and has solidarity and resolve D0:37, P0: Report Illegal checkpoints D0:31, P0: Non-interference, deadly force authorized D0:27, P0: Do not Support terrorists D0:34, P0: Terrorists not safe in Afg. D0:45, P0: Neg. results of supporting terrorism D0:29, P0: Support the ANA and Coalition D0:29, P0: Leader targets are discredited D1:19, P1: a Reward for Bin Laden D1:16, P1: a Reward for Ayman Al-Zawhiri D1:45, P1: Informed of activities, plans, etc. D1:11, P1: Informed of activities, plans, etc. D1:44, P2: Do not shine lights at aircraft D0:57, P1: Do not play with toy guns D1:40, P1: a Turn in ACM equipment D1:40, P1: Support Afghan Government D1:30, P1: a Rewards for terrorist info D0:39, P1: Evils of the Taliban D1:58, P1: a International Support to AF D1:39, P1: a Report ACM activity D1:37, P2: a Report ACM activity D0:41, P0: a Rewards for ACM information D0:34, P0: Desertion and defects with Taliban D2:09, P1: Searching of females need D2:16, P2: Mine and UXO dangers D1:33, P1: Wash hands and Boil Water D1:05, P1: LAG and CF here to help and stay D1:39, P1: Don't attempt to bribe CF for PUCs D1:28, P0: Landmines and explosives deadly D1:40, P1: ACM offering monetary rewards D1:37, P2: ANA motivation to battle terrorism D1:36, P2: Don't kill CFs or AMFs for money D1:44, P2: Road linking Asadabad and Jalalabad D0:41, P0:57 Figure 35. (PSYOP injects for a two week period) The fact that the Merlin project is strategic in scope is noteworthy. Strategic PSYOP is usually done by OGAs or the state department. However, the federal government has been remiss in conducting strategic PSYOP as it doesn t have or provide the funds to do so on an effective basis. This is my opinion after being the lead officer in charge of the Merlin initiative th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: November 2004). 101

119 VT MERLIN Regional Music Regional Music AFB 1253 Pashto Regional Music Outro Dari (m) Regional Music Outro Pashto (f) Intro Dari (m) Intro Pashto (f) Regional Music Regional Music Station ID Dari Regional Music Station ID Pashto Regional Music AFB 1251 DARI 1 Radio wheel = 1 hour of broadcast 1 Day = 13 radio wheels 1 Day = 18 hrs of broadcasts AFB 1253 Dari Regional Music Station ID Pashto Regional Music Station ID Dari Regional Music AFB 1251 Pashto Regional Music Regional Music Figure Hour Radio Wheel th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: November 2004). Above is an example of 1 hour radio wheel. The majority of the hour is information, news, and music that the target audience is accustomed to. 18 of these wheels are produced each day and then sent to VT Merlin. Also note that each PSYOP message has to be stated twice for the Pashtu and Dari speaking audiences of Afghanistan. 102

120 Figure 37. (Shortwave propagation strength) th BN / 4 th PSYOP Group (Airborne) JPOTF. Operational Summary (JPOTF FWD Afghanistan: November 2004). Above is the shortwave propagation that is transmitted from the UK out towards Afghanistan. There were no problems with the countries in between due to VT Merlin coordinating and reserving frequencies at the yearly broadcasting convention. However, the signal does carry out to China. 103