Alex Watson
Ashoka University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Buddhist Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Hindu Philosophy, Sanskrit language and literature, Sanskrit, Sanskrit Philology, and 27 moreSanskrit Literature, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya, Mimamsa, Advaita Vedanta, Vedanta, Psychoanalytic Theory, Philosophy of Psychoanalysis, Humanistic Psychotherapy, Gestalt Therapy, Existential Phenomenological Psychotherapy, South Asian Studies, Buddhism, Hinduism, Kashmir Shaivism, Yogacara Buddhism, Śaivism, Saiva Siddhanta, Saivism, Philosophy - South Indian Saiva Siddhanta and Indian Culture, Śaiva Siddhānta and Early Āgamic Śaivism, Dharmakīrti, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Philology, and Religious Studiesedit
- I work on both the History of Indian Philosophy and Sanskrit Philologyedit
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In this encyclopaedia entry I give a summary of the stage that atheistic argumentation had reached in India by the end of the 9th century. Atheistic arguments involved (1) pointing to logical fallacies in the inference(s) that Naiyayikas... more
In this encyclopaedia entry I give a summary of the stage that atheistic argumentation had reached in India by the end of the 9th century. Atheistic arguments involved (1) pointing to logical fallacies in the inference(s) that Naiyayikas used to establish the existence of God, and (2) highlighting certain unresolvable difficulties concerning God’s nature.
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The article concerns a mediaeval Indian debate over whether, and if so how, we can know that a self (ātman) exists, understood here as a subject of cognition (jñātṛ) that outlives individual cognitions, being their common substrate. A... more
The article concerns a mediaeval Indian debate over whether, and if so how, we can know that a self (ātman) exists, understood here as a subject of cognition (jñātṛ) that outlives individual cognitions, being their common substrate. A passage that has not yet been translated from Sanskrit into a European language, from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī (c. 890 CE), ‘Blossoms of Reasoning’, is examined. This rich passage reveals something not yet noted in secondary literature, namely that Mīmāṃsakas advanced four different models of what happens when the self perceives itself. The article clarifies the differences between the four, and the historical and logical relationships between them. It also hypothesizes pressures that constituted the need for the creation of the newer views, i.e. perceived problems with the earlier views, which the proponents of the newer views saw themselves as overcoming.
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In contemporary Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, “attention” is a burgeoning field, with ever-increasing amounts of empirical research and philosophical analysis being directed toward it. In this article I make a first attempt to... more
In contemporary Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, “attention” is a burgeoning field, with ever-increasing amounts of empirical research and philosophical analysis being directed toward it. In this article I make a first attempt to contrast how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists would address some aspects of attention that are discussed in that literature. The sources of what I attribute to “Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas” are the sections dealing with the manas (“internal organ”, “organ of attention”) in the Nyāyabhāṣya, Nyāyamañjarī, and Praśastapādabhāṣya. The words “Buddhist” and “Buddhism” in this essay refer specifically to the Sautrāntika Buddhism of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (350–430 CE). A comparison involving a later phase of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinking on this matter, a later phase of Buddhism, or a different branch of Buddhism may well yield different results.
Section I lays out the ontological postulates that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists deemed necessary for the explanation of attention. Section II looks at three arguments that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas gave for their principal postulate, the manas, and three corresponding Buddhist responses to these arguments. Sections III and IV look at contrasting Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist explanations of, respectively, “shifts of attention” and “competition for attention.” Sections V and VI consider whether the Buddhist model can adequately account for voluntary or endogenous attention, and whether the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika model can adequately account for involuntary or exogenous attention. In the closing section I identify three things that are commonly attributed to attention and that may seem impossible in both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist models; I show how the two Indian models can account for them.
Section I lays out the ontological postulates that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists deemed necessary for the explanation of attention. Section II looks at three arguments that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas gave for their principal postulate, the manas, and three corresponding Buddhist responses to these arguments. Sections III and IV look at contrasting Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Buddhist explanations of, respectively, “shifts of attention” and “competition for attention.” Sections V and VI consider whether the Buddhist model can adequately account for voluntary or endogenous attention, and whether the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika model can adequately account for involuntary or exogenous attention. In the closing section I identify three things that are commonly attributed to attention and that may seem impossible in both the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist models; I show how the two Indian models can account for them.
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The paper introduces first Nietzsche and then Heidegger’s views on conscience and guilt. It next identifies the ways in which their stances are opposed. Finally, it argues that from a psychotherapeutic perspective, it is the Nietzschean... more
The paper introduces first Nietzsche and then Heidegger’s views on conscience and guilt. It next identifies the ways in which their stances are opposed. Finally, it argues that from a psychotherapeutic perspective, it is the Nietzschean ideas that are more likely to be fertile directions of thought for clients.
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The article argues that the importation into psychoanalytic theory of the terms “self” and “subject” is neither true to Freud’s intentions, nor necessary, nor helpful. Having observed how Freud undermined these concepts in both his... more
The article argues that the importation into psychoanalytic theory of the terms “self” and “subject” is neither true to Freud’s intentions, nor necessary, nor helpful. Having observed how Freud undermined these concepts in both his Topographical Model and Structural Model, the article turns to the position of Ogden. Two of his contributions masterfully deconstruct the concept of “the subject” through a selection of positions advocated by Freud, Klein, and Winnicott. But he then revitalizes the concept in his own way, claiming it to be “central” and “irreducible.” This article argues for a more radical stance than Ogden’s; whereas Ogden is reductionist with regard to the subject, this article argues for eliminativism.
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Research Interests: Comparative Religion, Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Philosophy, Phenomenology, Indian Buddhism, and 12 moreNyaya, Vaisesika, Hindu Philosophy, Saiva Siddhanta, Kashmir Shaivism, Indian Philosophy and Religion, Saivism, Philosophy - South Indian Saiva Siddhanta and Indian Culture, Śaiva Siddhānta and Early Āgamic Śaivism, Dharmakīrti, Dharmakirti, and ŚAiva Traditions
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Research Interests: Indian Philosophy, Buddhist Philosophy, Nyaya, Vaisesika, Hindu Philosophy, and 8 moreSaiva Siddhanta, Kashmir Shaivism, Saivism, Philosophy - South Indian Saiva Siddhanta and Indian Culture, Śaivism, Śaiva traditions, Phenomenology, Comparative Religion, Śaiva Siddhānta and Early Āgamic Śaivism, and Dharmakīrti
Research Interests:
In contemporary Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, ‘attention’ is a burgeoning field, with ever increasing amounts of empirical research and philosophical analysis being directed towards it in recent years. In this paper I make a... more
In contemporary Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind, ‘attention’ is a burgeoning field, with ever increasing amounts of empirical research and philosophical analysis being directed towards it in recent years. In this paper I make a first attempt to contrast how Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Buddhists would address some aspects of attention that are discussed in that literature.