Evan Clarke

This paper looks at the Neo-Kantian response to Darwinism as a historical science. I distinguish four responses to this aspect of Darwin's thought within the Neo-Kantian tradition. The first line of response, represented by August Stadler and Bruno Bauch, views Darwin's model of historical explanation as a fulfillment of Kant's criteria of scientific intelligibility. The second, represented by Otto Liebmann, regards historical explanation as intrinsically limited, because it cannot tell us why nature develops as it does. The third line of response questions whether we can give a historical account of qualitative change. Friedrich Lange expresses this skepticism in general terms, while Alois Riehl and Ernst Cassirer extend it to human beings specifically. Both deny that we can account for 'higher faculties' in terms of gradual change. A fourth line of response, represented by Heinrich Rickert, challenges the misperception that Darwin's theory tells us something about the meaning of history.

This paper concerns the role that the principle of the conservation of energy plays in the thought of Alois Riehl. After a few words of historical background, I consider the basic philosophical significance that Riehl attributes to this principle. I show that for Riehl, the principle of the conservation of energy represents a condition of possibility for objective experience. I go on to explore the antinomy that Riehl elicits between the principle of the conservation of energy and the idea of natural selection. I explain how Riehl’s doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism, according to which the psychic and the physical are mutually irreducible perspectives on a single underlying reality, arises from his efforts to resolve this antinomy. Finally, I consider Riehl’s assessment of the work of the physicist and physician Robert Julius Mayer, one of the co-discoverers of the principle of the conservation of energy. I show that for Riehl, Mayer is uniquely significant in having grasped the meaning of the principle of the conservation of energy. This emerges from Riehl’s discussion of Mayer’s methodology, his overarching objectives, his understanding of causality, and his notion of Auslösung.

This article presents an overview of the Neo-Kantian movement in philosophy that spanned the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and that was concentrated geographically in Germany. Following a summary of the institutional and intellectual context surrounding Neo-Kantianism, the article explores the core philosophical principles associated with the movement, attending in particular to the ways in which Neo-Kantian philosophers appropriate and depart from the core tenets of Kant’s critical philosophy. Subsequently, the article rehearses the distinction between the Marburg and the Southwest schools of Neo-Kantianism, sketching the defining features of each school, and the main areas of disagreement between them. The article concludes by summarizing the theoretical contributions of the principal members of each school: Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Ernst Cassirer from theMarburg School, and Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, and Emil Lask, from theSouthwest School

This volume presents a comprehensive selection of contemporaneous responses to Husserl's work. Ranging in date from 1906 to 1917, these texts bookend Husserl's landmark Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913). The selection encompasses essays that Husserl responded to directly in the Ideas I, as well as a number of the critical and sympathetic essays that appeared in the wake of its
publication. Significantly, the present volume also includes Husserl's subsequent
responses to his critics. All of the texts included have been translated into
English for the first time, introducing the reader to a wide range of long neglected
material that is highly relevant to contemporary debates regarding the
meaning and possibility of phenomenology.